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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Marcus William Mayorga   
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
June 2019 
 
Title: An Introspection Intervention for Perceived Inefficacy in Charitable Giving 
 
 
Observed biases in how people value human life have sparked an area of research 
investigating the mental processes leading to the devaluing of mass suffering. Parallel lines 
of research in psychology, economics, marketing, and environmental sciences are seeking 
to understand why people act to help others at all. The emotional and deliberative process 
in contexts of giving behaviors are complex and evolving. This dissertation focuses on one 
such bias: pseudoinefficacy, or the dampening of anticipated positive affect from giving, 
driven by the sense that we cannot help everyone at risk in given context.     
First a literature review of the relevant studies and previous work on the concept 
of “warm glow” is presented. Next, two studies are described that were conducted in an 
effort to replicate previous findings and test a possible de-biasing intervention: structured 
introspection. A structured introspection task that asked participants to think deeply about 
the factors influencing their prosocial decisions was tested against instructions to 
deliberate and against a no-instruction control. Results were mixed. The pseudoinefficacy 
manipulation failed to replicate previous findings of dampened positive affect by being 
reminded of individual outside of reach for help. The introspection condition showed no 
obvious benefit in a one-shot donation paradigm. However, a study on blood donation 
found a significant increase in self-efficacy from the introspective task, leading to greater 
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intentions to donate, and indirectly increasing actual donation behavior compared to the 
other conditions. An exploration of the data and future directions are discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Biases and heuristics in decision making are well documented (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Many biases are hypothesized to manifest as a result of 
overreliance on quick, emotional thinking, in contrast to our more recently evolved pre-
frontal cognitive systems (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002).  Research in decision 
making provides a bedrock for the study of cognition and influence of emotional systems 
in different areas of social psychology. Decisions to help others, either by donating 
money, resources, or time have been found to be similarly influenced by inherent 
cognitive and emotional factors, both conscious and unconscious (Fetherstonhaugh, 
Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997; Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Small & Verrochi, 2009). 
Psychology research also documents that individual differences in personality and 
emotion processing traits can greatly affect the perception and interpretation of 
information and subsequently alter motivations and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987; Furnham, 2003; Kahan, 2012; McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012).   
It is important to first establish what is meant by the term “prosocial behavior”. 
Brief and Motowidlo (1986) provide a useful definition for prosocial behaviors, “They 
are positive social acts carried out to produce and maintain the well-being and integrity of 
others” (p.710). It would also be useful to add a clause to this definition that prosocial 
behavior also requires some cost to the agent, whether it is money, time, or other 
resource. For example, the director of a charity may allocate funds to help others, and 
produce or maintain well-being of others; but, the money to do so has come from the 
donors. Thus the action of allocating the funds does not imply a prosocial behavior on the 
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part of the director. Prosocial behaviors can manifest in a variety of behaviors, not just 
donating money. Volunteering, donating blood or organs, simple acts of kindness and 
environmental conservation work all fall under the altruistic umbrella of prosocial 
behaviors.  
 Several unanswered questions remain in this area of research. In contexts where 
prosocial action is possible, how do emotions and affect generally motivate action? The 
known research on the effect of emotions on prosocial action suggests that emotions are 
linked with several psychological factors. For example, biases in evaluating the value of 
life are differentially predicted by emotional states and perceived efficacy (Erlandsson, 
Björklund, & Bäckström, 2014). How these factors interact in complex scenarios with 
multiple victims is difficult to parse out. The stimuli presented are often as important as 
the context in influencing choice (Small & Verrochi, 2009). By studying the interplay of 
the decision frame and individual differences in traits, this thesis aims to explore the 
different ways people can process a request for prosocial action. 
 Beyond understanding more about emotional system’s role in charitable 
decisions, this thesis aims to de-bias responses to prosocial requests that are driven by 
emotional processing.  Previous work has found that anticipated positive affect from a 
prosocial behavior is diminished when we are made reminded of individuals we cannot 
help (Västfjäll, Slovic, & Mayorga, 2015). Two studies will explore a intervention 
designed to bolster self-efficacy and positive affect, using the novel method of a 
structured introspection, compared to deliberative thought and control. For Study 1, I 
hypothesize that structured introspection instruction will draw attention to the sources of 
affective biases, and will negate the predicted affective hit from seeing children at risk 
3 
who are unable to be helped. Study 2 makes a similar prediction for blood donation: 
introspecting on the factors that should influence decisions to give blood will lead to 
greater warm glow and intentions to engage in a blood donation (compared to control). 
This effect will be amplified when facts regarding the scope of the need are also 
provided. Several exploratory analyses are planned to investigate the interaction of 
individual differences with motivations for prosocial behavior. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prosocial motivations 
In the simplest terms, why do we help others? What drives people to help other people, 
animals, or ecosystems for seemingly no personal benefit and often significant personal 
cost? One controversial explanation is that people are pure altruists (see reviews: Krebs, 
1970; Piliavin & Charng, 2016). People give because they are motivated purely by the 
sake of giving. Skeptics of pure altruism argue that while people appear to be pure 
altruists, their motives for helping may also concealed by egotistical goals, thus becoming 
“impure” altruism. It may be that giving in and of itself is motivator psychological reward 
(similar to a moral duty; Kant, 1999) but giving behaviors are also inherently linked with 
activation in reward centers and a variety of other social influences. A contemporary 
standpoint of altruism suggests that pure altruism may exist (Harbaugh, Mayr, & 
Burghart, 2007) but there is mounting evidence that people help others for self-centered 
reasons. The evolutionary development of social behavior can help elucidate how giving 
can be rooted in egoism.  
 In general, helping others tends decrease our fitness or ability to survive or 
decreases chance of genetic propagation. For example, sharing food or water with others 
means less is available for the helper. From an evolutionary perspective, altruism is 
maladaptive and should be rare or effectively eliminated via natural selection. 
Evolutionary psychologists have explained the existence of helping behaviors through 
“kin altruism” or the theory that people help others because it benefits their genetic 
relatives (Silk & House, 2011). Kin altruism offers a straightforward explanation for why 
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we help our families and (to a lesser extent) our friends and community members. The 
underlying premise of kin altruism is that actions that help others will ultimately help us. 
By giving to family we are insuring the survival of our genetic material. By giving to 
community members we help motivate these members to return aid. This explanation 
paints a picture of human helping behavior as inherently egotistical and, while we may 
seem to be helping others for their benefit, we are merely acting to help ourselves (or our 
genetic offspring). 
 Another explanation for altruistic behavior, reciprocal altruism, characterizes 
prosocial behavior as inherently selfish but in a more direct way: people help others 
because it ultimately helps the self if others benefit. In other words, we help because we 
will get something in return. This explanation has numerous examples in the animal 
kingdom through symbiotic relationships among cohabitating species, such as a study of 
monkey grooming that found that monkeys paid more attention to group members that 
reciprocated grooming than to monkeys of their own kin (Seyfarth & Cheyney, 1984).  
 No one theory will be able to explain the plethora of possible prosocial behaviors 
and their determinants. It is likely that each of these perspectives on giving are more or 
less explanatory in different circumstances. However, the circumstances in which we 
make decisions to help others have changed dramatically. Technological advances have 
revolutionized the way that people can exhibit prosocial behavior. Online giving has risen 
steadily over the last decade, now accounting for 7.6% of all NGO fundraising 
(Blackbaud, 2017). Within the online market, giving money to others can now be done 
from virtually any location, with mobile donations accounting for 21% of the online 
donations. One can now donate money to a foreign charity or loan to a startup business in 
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a developing country with a pocket size device from anywhere with an internet 
connection. As a side-effect of this technology, giving to others now requires no personal 
interaction with another person. You can interact entirely with a virtual representation of 
the need (e.g. appeals with video, pictures, narrative of the needy), the NGO (e.g. charity 
websites) and the act of giving (e.g. automatic deposit of electronic funds).   
Another important side-effect of this technological shift is that these virtual 
representations are readily available to our perception (sometimes obtrusively, e.g. pop 
up advertisements). We are immersed in an interconnected world and are suddenly more 
aware of worldwide events. Disasters and catastrophes can now be experienced in real-
time through live-streams or reviewed and discussed ad infinitum through online videos 
with accompanying forums. The human mind, evolved for communal living and kin 
preference is now situated in an ever-present stream of information. As a result, our 
primal psychological systems produce predictable and observable biases in attitude and 
choice. These biases can sometimes lead humans to be more altruistic in certain situations 
while less altruistic in others (e.g. psychic numbing, more on this later). 
 Situations that provide opportunities for prosocial behavior are often complex, 
and influential psychological forces can range from basic perceptions and attention to 
nuanced social pressures from particular individuals, or an attempt at self-identity 
maintenance. Thus, how one decides whether one is going are to engage in a prosocial 
behavior or not (and to what degree) can be influenced by subtle cues in the environment, 
emotional anchors (i.e. the affect heuristic; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
2000), and rational or deliberative thought patterns. Research in psychology, marketing, 
economics, and environmental science have experienced a boom in studies attempting to 
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understand this busy psychological landscape of giving (e.g. Brekke, Kipperberg, & 
Nyborg, 2010; Andreoni, 2007; Donegani, McKay, & Moro, 2012). Ongoing 
investigations are seeking to understand how our more primitive psychological systems 
interact with and inform our more deliberative and calculated functions. This dissertation 
will explore how affect—or general positive or negative feelings—toward needy 
individuals is influenced by contextual cues in a giving environment and how this 
affective response is weighted in prosocial decisions. Three such biases documented in 
charitable decision making literature provide a framework with which to understand how 
experienced emotions are related to and influence prosocial behavior: psychic numbing, 
compassion fade, and pseudoinefficacy.  
Psychic Numbing 
The underlying principle of psychic numbing is straightforward: the degree to 
which we value the saving of lives tends to be positively related to the number of lives at 
risk with a diminishing rate. In other words, people demonstrate high value for individual 
and small numbers of lives; as the number increases the value goes up as well, but at a 
decreasing rate, not linearly scaled to the number at risk. Psychophysical limits of human 
perception are theorized to be basis of this phenomenon. Perceivable differences, whether 
they are increments of light or sound, are related to a fixed percentage, known as 
"Weber's law" (Weber, 1834). Thus, perceived differences are relative. For example, 
imagine yourself in a dark room. If a single light bulb suddenly illuminated this room, 
you would immediately notice the difference. Adding a second light bulb would be 
noticeable as well but less so than the first, and the third bulb even less so. If additional 
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bulbs were added, one by one, up to 9,999, you would likely not notice the addition of the 
10,000th bulb.  
Our perceptive processes have evolved to notice incremental changes in our 
surroundings, a process best at determining the existence or non-existence of a stimulus 
rather than a gradient increase to large numbers. The keen perceptive ability in noticing 
singular differences, which keeps humans alive in physically threatening environments, 
can be maladaptive for society, in a modern world where we are increasingly aware of 
mass genocide, natural disasters, disease, and famine. The concept of a suffering 
individual becomes difficult at this scale and attempting to apply the same feelings to 
millions becomes a dizzying mental exercise. The human perceptual systems are unable 
to scale emotions to a level that is relative to the need of such large scale tragedies. 
Psychic numbing is explained as a fault of the emotional system to process the scale of 
need in a way that necessitates action (Slovic, 2007). As a result, humans often exhibit 
behavior that implies psychological insensitivity to the suffering of masses. 
Decision-making and related fields in psychology support a two system process of 
thinking, commonly referred to as System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich & West, 2000).  
System 1 is known as our "Experiential System" or our affective reactions. This mode of 
thinking is quick and responsive to our environment. It uses past experiences and 
association to draw "gut feelings." System 2, or the "Analytic System", is logic based. It 
is associated with the use of reason, conscious appraisal, and the use of abstract symbols, 
words, and numbers in a purposeful manner. Consequentially, system 2 is much slower, 
requiring time to process information (Epstein, 1994). These two systems are not 
exclusive and they are often used in tandem to evaluate decision contexts.   
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The interplay of system 1 and 2 has important implications for the issue of 
psychic numbing. In a rational world, our responses to tragedies would linearly match the 
scale of the issue. For example, 2,000 lives saved from malaria would feel twice as good 
and be valued twice as much as 1,000 lives saved. Recent research has shown that our 
behavioral reactions to humanitarian issues are far from linear, depending on the 
properties of the population at risk. Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich 
(1997) found that proportion of lives saved is more heavily weighted than absolute values 
in motivating helping behavior. Participants preferred to help groups that were a larger 
proportion of the greater need, even when the number of those helped was equal.  
Relying on emotions and intuitions can cause humans to fall short of humanitarian 
ideals. Colloquial golden rules of equality, genocide prevention, and human rights are 
threatened by the limits of human psychology. NGO’s and charitable organizations are 
challenged to raise funds in this environment, a decision space flooded with affective 
stimuli, all competing for our attention and appreciation of “dire need”. Charitable 
organizations that help in developing nations and war torn areas often use pictures or 
videos of children at risk, capitalizing on the affective system’s tendency to pay attention 
to emotional content. 
Current research suggests that displaying mere pictures of needy individuals are 
often sufficient and even powerful forces in invoking affective reactions (Västfjäll, 
Slovic, Mayorga, & Peters, 2014). Burt and Strongman (2005) found that images of 
children elicit particularly powerful emotional reactions. Dickert and Slovic (2009) found 
that the picture of single child in need elicited more intense affect than a picture of 
several children. Our connection to other humans is strong, and when viewing the faces 
10 
of other humans we can connect with their experience. Small and Verrochi (2009) found 
that faces in ads soliciting charitable donations generated reports of strong emotion in the 
viewers. One possible mechanism driving emotion reactions to pictures is emotional 
contagion, or the concept that we mimic the emotional states of people within our span of 
attention. When we perceive suffering our eyebrows furrow; when we perceive 
happiness, we smile. Vignettes containing personal information (but not statistical facts) 
of needy individuals may increase the effect of the emotional contagion. Emotional 
contagion has even been found between humans and virtual agents, suggesting that our 
emotional connection with other beings is a very deep-seated and reflexive psychological 
phenomenon, with the possibility of extending to non-human subjects (Tsai, Bowring, 
Marsella, Wood & Tambe, 2012).  
How emotional content is processed and aggregated between multiple sources and 
targets is still unclear. As charitable decisions are inherently complex, it is not well 
understood how people integrate multiple sources of affective information. For example, 
pictures of success stories and prospering individuals may be mixed with stimuli of 
current dire need or greater context of struggle. To what degree are the emotions invoked 
from these positive or negative stimuli integrated or discriminated? How does attention 
modulate the weight given to and the intensity of the feeling experienced? How do 
regulation tendencies and specific strategies alter this process? These questions will 
require further investigation to understand the nature of psychic numbing in charitable 
decisions.  
The current study uses images and videos of children in short vignettes, 
explaining their need to receive aid, and offering the participant a chance to engage in 
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prosocial behavior. However, the current study also includes pictures and information 
about children for whom aid may not be available, to explore possible motivating or 
demotivating effects of seeing individual beyond our reach.  
Compassion Fade 
Although research on psychic numbing is sounding an alarm, evidence of 
compassion fade is an even darker omen. The idea of compassion fade is that not only 
does our valuation of life-saving fail to scale to the need but, as the need increases to an 
incomprehensible scale, the demonstrated value may actually begin to decrease, rather 
than just plateau. As we become increasingly aware of the millions of children at risk of 
death, collapsing ecosystems, and widespread injustices, we simply cannot maintain our 
concern for such monumental challenges and we do not act to address them. An 
individual’s actions can be perceived as only a “drop in bucket” for dealing with the 
problem as whole. This effect has been shown to be present in groups as small as 2, 
where preference is given to helping 1 child in need over helping 2 together (Slovic et al., 
2011).  
The fade of compassion can be understood as an adaptive response for the 
survival of the individual inundated with emotional stressors: lowering concern for 
massive problems to which most individuals have relatively little control can decrease 
stress responses and protect sensitive people from obtrusive negative thoughts. On a 
global scale, however, compassion fade becomes a dangerous thought pattern, leading to 
apathetic tolerance of atrocities and catastrophe. The affective underpinnings of 
compassion fade are thus crucial to the perception of self-efficacy in prosocial 
opportunities. Our perception that we can “make a difference” is likely constructed from 
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environmental cues, as well as individual differences in self-efficacy and emotion 
processing and regulation. In theory, affective cues can influence perceived efficacy by 
depressing mood and corrupting the anticipation of positive emotions associated with 
prosocial behavior, a phenomenon known as pseudoinefficacy.  
Butts, Lunts, Freling, and Gabriel (2019) published a large meta-analysis of the 
effect of compassion fade in the literature. Studies were coded for manipulated content 
and in the outcome variables to study a process model across the varying designs. 
Modeling results across studies support the notion that as victim size increases, it 
depresses feelings of empathic concern, perceived impact, and anticipated positive affect 
(warm glow). These psychological factors then interdependently motivate the agent to 
engage in a helping behavior. This research adds support for a multi-factor model of 
prosocial motivations, although the meta-analysis found the effect sizes of these 
mechanisms to be relatively small (β coefficients ranging .14 to .35).    
Pseudoinefficacy  
In many prosocial situations, not all individuals or targets who need help are able 
to receive it. While humanitarian efforts may be able to provide aid to one area of the 
world, other areas are simply inaccessible due to natural or human-made obstructions 
(e.g. political barriers). The conscious or unconscious awareness of this fact can have 
significant effects on how humans react to tragic situations. As discussed by 
Featherstonhaugh et al. (1997), humans are sensitive to the proportion of people they are 
choosing to help. When we are faced with an overwhelming need or daunting statistics, 
our efforts to provide help start to appear dwarfed or as simply a “drop in the bucket”. 
While it may be tragic that others cannot be helped, it is illogical to be demotivated from 
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helping because of this. Of course, some logical reasons to abstain from helping exist, 
such as monetary constraints or political controversy involving the persons in need. The 
notion of interest here is on the mere existence of perceiving individuals that we can’t 
help may impede our ability to aid those we can help. In these situations we can 
experience illogical feelings of inefficacy, or believe that we cannot make a difference in 
the face of an overwhelming need, a pseudo-inefficacy. Demotivation may subsequently 
increase behavior patterns that are indicative of experienced psychic numbing 
compassion fade.  
Unpublished research by Mayorga (2012) suggests that not everyone responds to 
proportional information (i.e. unaided individuals) in the context of prosocial aid in the 
same way, some becoming demotivated by the greater need while others are motivated 
more. For some individuals, the information about the children beyond their reach 
appears to be a source of motivation to help those within reach. This study inquired about 
motivational differences in response to unaided individuals by asking two questions, 
“When thinking about the child in need that I could not help, I felt demotivated from 
helping the child I could help” and, “Seeing the child that I could not help motivated me 
to help the other child more.” In splitting the sample by levels of agreement to these 
questions, three major types of motivational reactions emerged: pseudoinefficacy 
(demotivated), anti-pseudoinefficacy (motivated more), and neither motivated nor 
demotivated. First are the subjects who agreed to statement 1 (demotivation) and 
disagreed with statement 2 (motivation). This response supports the notion that a portion 
of individuals are demotivated by seeing the needy individuals outside their range of help 
and (illogically) turn away from or lessen their helping behavior and associated positive 
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feelings. When presented with opportunities to help (in the face of individuals who are 
out of reach), demotivated individuals demonstrated lower average (hypothetical) 
donations to help a needy individual than the other two groups and depressed anticipated 
affect from helping. 
The second category included subjects who disagreed with feeling demotivated 
and agreed to feeling motivated more. These individuals seemed to effectively cope with 
seeing those they cannot help and concluded to help those within reach by increasing 
their helping behavior. This subgroup gave more donations on average and report greater 
anticipated positive emotion from helping than the other two groups. The third emerging 
group reports to be neither motivated nor demotivated and is thus suspected to be using 
some other information or normative rule to make their decision, such as a moral code or 
monetary concerns. This group reported mean donations that tend to fall in-between the 
other two groups. This research shows clear differences in how people process the 
information of the greater need and suggests that some individual difference is 
moderating the perception of this information. The study further found that the 
personality trait neuroticism may play an important role in shaping motivation to help in 
charitable context with negative emotion stimuli, particularly in its association with 
emotion processing. Neurotic individuals in this study were more likely to report feeling 
demotivated by the children out of reach. 
Higher order traits such as personality measures can be effective at understanding 
behavior trends and the root causes of complex behaviors. By drawing upon previous 
research in personality and charitable behavior, we can make informed inferences about 
how differences personality shape motivational forces in prosocial behavior. If a 
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particular personality trait shows a strong relationship with experienced pseudoinefficacy, 
further investigation may be able to shed light on any specific individual differences in 
affective or deliberative processes that guide motivation in charitable decision making.  
Individual Differences and Prosocial Behavior  
Recent research has examined the Five-Factor model of personality in charitable 
giving and more broadly in decision-making with prosocial contexts (e.g. dictator games, 
environmental conservation). Much of current literature has focused the role of 
Extraversion in prosocial behavior, with a general consensus that more extraverted 
individuals tend to also be more prosocial (Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman 2005; 
Garcia-Banda et al., 2011; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008;; Landis et al., 2009).  
Agreeableness has also been found to be associated with prosocial behavior. 
Agreeableness, by definition, is closely related to altruism. The common items measuring 
agreeableness ask people, for example, to rate themselves as someone who, “is helpful 
and unselfish with others” or “has a forgiving nature” (John et al., 2008). A person high 
in agreeableness is sympathetic to others and is interested in helping behaviors. 
Conversely, persons who score low in agreeableness tend to be egocentric and untrusting 
of others’ intentions (Rothman & Coetzer, 2002). Egocentric behaviors of persons who 
score low in agreeableness surface in altruistic-themed tasks, such as dictator game 
experiments (Ashton, Paunonen, Helms, & Douglas, 1998). Individuals high in 
agreeableness have been found to be more generous to kin, collaborators, and even 
competitors (Ben-Ner & Kramer, 2011).  
The relationship of agreeableness and altruism/egocentrism could be driven by an 
underlying mechanism of emotional responsiveness and control. Persons high in 
16 
Agreeableness report greater emotional responsiveness in social situations and also take 
more active efforts to control emotion (Tobin, Vanman, & Tassinary, 2000; Tobin & 
Graziano, 2011).  This supports the notion that Agreeableness reflects the desire to please 
or get along with others and that social adaptability and emotional regulation are essential 
behaviors for maintaining strong social bonds. Additionally, Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, 
and Tobin (2007) showed that high Agreeableness can moderate or effectively suppress 
the dominant self-centered emotions so that other-oriented (empathic concern) can be 
expressed. In the context of a charitable or prosocial scenario, the level of agreeableness 
that  agents possess could influence the degree to which they focus on victims or needy 
individuals. Agreeableness has also been linked to effortful control, thus highly agreeable 
individuals may also effectively regulate negative emotions in context with needy victims 
(Graziano et al., 2007).  
There is also evidence for Neuroticism affecting how emotions are controlled. 
Neuroticism can also be understood as the reciprocal term for emotional stability. 
Individual items measuring neuroticism ask people, for example, to rate themselves as 
someone who, “worries a lot” or “gets nervous easily” (John et al., 2008). People who 
score high on neuroticism experience greater negative emotion and have increased 
chance of psychological distress.  Ode and Robinson (2007) found significant a main 
effect of Neuroticism on somatic symptoms, suggesting that more neurotic people also 
experience more physiological arousal from emotional stimuli. Individuals who score 
high on neuroticism have been linked to higher levels of fear, guilt, shame, and sadness 
(Kokkonen, 2001; Watson, David, & Suls, 1999). Additionally, neuroticism is related to a 
plethora of maladaptive behavior such as self-blame, poor emotion regulation, less 
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positive reinterpretations of life events, and less active planning and coping (Boland & 
Cappeliez, 1997; Ciarrochi, Chain, & Caputi, 2000; Gunthert, Cogen, & Stephen, 1999; 
McCrae & Costa, 1986; Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1994; Scheir, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). 
These tendencies toward negative emotional experiences suggest that neurotic individuals 
may be more negatively influenced affect-rich stimuli, such as a pictures and videos of 
suffering individuals.  
Personality research provides a footprint to which to track the psychological 
process that moderates prosocial motivation. Agreeableness appears to be related to 
approach-related behaviors toward helping. Neuroticism, on the other hand, predicts an 
avoidance or reactive response to negative stimuli. The research on agreeableness and 
neuroticism offers a trail, alluding that the tendency to engage with emotional stimuli, as 
well as the tendency to use that stimuli as information in a decision, may moderate the 
influence of affective cues that lead to prosocial action in the face of large scale need. 
Two specific processes are explored in the current study, rational/experiential tendencies 
and emotional intelligence.  
The dual process model of cognition provides a bimodal method of measuring and 
studying individual differences in thinking style. People vary in respect to how much they 
engage with intuitive thought and deliberative thought. For example, some people put 
more weight into their initial feeling toward a choice or “go with their guts” in making 
important decisions. Conversely, others downplay intuitive reactions and tend to use 
critical thought when evaluating choices.  
People also exhibit differences in the ability to express their thinking preferences, 
such that some people may have a preference to engage in rational thought over intuitive 
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processing but have poor reasoning skills, or have stronger emotional reactions that 
impede rational thought. The interplay of the ability and thinking preference among these 
two systems could dramatically affect how emotional stimuli in life-saving scenarios are 
processed. If a person has a strong emotional reaction to a charity appeal, and heavily 
weights that affective response in the decision, it would likely produce a different 
behavior pattern than someone who experiences little emotion and prefers to put weight 
factual information of scenario for their choice.  
A large body of recent research has found conflicting information about when 
thinking styles are important in decision making. The Rational Experiential Inventory 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999) measures four components of thinking style (Rational ability, 
Rational engagement, Experiential ability, Experiential engagement). A large meta-
analysis including over 17,000 participants found that tendencies for rational ability and 
engagement predicted small increases in performance in objective tasks, while 
experiential preferences were associated with a small decrease in performance, Phillips, 
Fletcher, Marks, & Hine, 2015). However, rational thinkers also tend to experience more 
decision regret and less satisfaction and confidence in their decision compared to intuitive 
thinkers. One important conclusion from this meta-analysis was that the context of the 
task matters such that tasks that support certain thinking styles (e.g. a complex trade-off 
task vs a quick-response emotional identification task) will moderate the effect size of 
thinking style. In addition, the REI (and other individual difference measures) rely on 
self-report of thinking style, requiring a somewhat sophisticated level of reflection to 
represent global thinking patterns in various contexts on a likert scale. The cognitive 
reflection task (CRT) was designed to provide an objective measure of how thinking style 
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relates to performance (Frederick, 2005). This measure tests subjects on quiz questions 
that have an incorrect, intuitive answers and an obscure, correct answer that is designed 
to be revealed after a small amount of deliberative thought. Studies have found that this 
type of task can predict performance on other decisions that are susceptible to a range of 
heuristics and biases (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011) and even moral judgment 
(Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015). Thus, the innate tendencies we have when 
evaluating a decision task can shape how the contextual information is processed. 
However, the thinking style that one employs does not capture the sequence of processing 
that occurs once a style is employed. Because scenarios of life-saving and charitable 
giving are wrought with emotional content, how the emotion is processed (not only that it 
is processed) is important to understanding how it relates to action.   
 Research on emotion and decision making suggests that emotional evaluations are 
generally quick and largely unconscious (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; 
Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & Macgregor, 2005). The processing of emotion can lead to 
conscious emotion regulation but regulation processes can occur without conscious 
awareness (i.e. anticipatory avoidance of emotion). Complicating things further, 
significant individual differences exist in emotion regulation ability (Gross, 2008). 
Similar to other modeled behaviors, it is believed that humans learn emotion regulation 
abilities and strategies early in development, although we begin to take a more active role 
in regulating our emotions as we age (Denham, 1998; Thompson & Meyer, 2007). Adults 
use many different types of emotion regulation strategies, such as avoidance, reappraisal, 
suppression, or problem-focused coping. Other facets of emotion processing are equally 
as important as regulation, such as the ability to recognize emotional content, the 
20 
physiological sensations generated with emotion, and the ability to discriminate among 
one’s experienced emotions (Joseph & Newman, 2010). However, more research is 
needed to determine which of these factors (emotional sensations, regulation, 
discrimination of emotion) are most critical in prosocial motivations.  
 Gratz and Roemer (2004) developed a multidimensional assessment of emotion 
regulation and dysregulation, called the Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). 
This 40-item scale measures both a global ability in regulating emotions and specific 
subscales: Impulse Control, Emotional Awareness, Emotion Clarity, Non-acceptance of 
Emotional Responses, Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies, and Difficulty 
Engaging in Goal Directed Behavior. Higher scores on the scale or subscale indicate 
greater difficulty in regulating or coping with emotions. In the context of charitable 
giving, neglecting to regulate negative emotions induced by the decision context can 
cause one to feel overwhelmed or depressed, leading to a diminished sense of efficacy, 
fewer anticipated positive feelings from giving, and (possibly) less giving behavior. 
Conversely, people who are skilled at recognizing emotional content and employ a 
successful emotion regulation strategy should be less likely to exhibit biases (e.g. 
compassion fade) when presented with affect-rich stimuli in the context of charitable 
giving.  
 A reliance on self-report measures means that some variance in unconscious 
emotion processing remains unaccounted for, but is likely to have a significant influence 
on explicit feelings and behavior. Focusing on the use of affect instead of explicit 
emotions could provide insight into how the unconscious mind determines which 
emotion stimuli are to be “let in”, or processed as relevant to the decision context. One 
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way to measure an individual’s use of affect in decisions is through the affect heuristic. 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2000) found that people tended to evaluate 
risks and benefits as negatively correlated among various hazards, while in reality risk 
and benefit are usually positively correlated. They posit that the reliance on affect as 
information causes riskier actions to be perceived as having low benefit. Skagerlund, 
Forsbad, Slovic, and Västfjäll (2019) developed an individual difference measure of an 
individuals’ tendency to use affect as information. The Emotional Reactivity Task (ERT) 
is measured by having people evaluate various hazards on risk and benefit and then 
calculating the within-person correlation between risk and benefit. This correlation, 
ranging from -1 to +1, could then be used to predict behavior in a prosocial context. One 
would predict that the more negative the correlation (greater use of affect as information) 
would predict a stronger reaction to emotion stimuli.  
Intervention design 
One of the goals of this thesis is to test an intervention for the biases affecting 
charitable giving that involve the perception of the need (psychic numbing, compassion 
fade, and pseudoinefficacy). Decisions for prosocial behavior can occur in a single 
instance (e.g. donating to charity) or can involve a commitment of behavior (e.g. 
volunteering). Thus the intervention needs to be adaptable to different behavioral 
contexts. Empirical research in decision making aids has found that formally structuring a 
decision problem can increase performance and decision satisfaction (Gregory, et al. 
2012).  This way of shaping a decision problem can be adapted to many situations 
without requiring expertise, such as extensive background knowledge or training. On the 
other hand, structured decision making requires careful and deliberative thought. In an 
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ideal world, where people had infinite cognitive resources, a structured decision making 
task could be used for donation decisions in which all outcomes are evaluated, choices 
are rated on various dimensions and then weighted choice options are evaluated before 
selection. However, in order for an intervention to be useful for prosocial behavior, it 
must also be succinct; a lengthy and taxing process before a solicitation of prosocial 
action would likely produce reactance and be poorly received in practice.  
How much deliberation is required to improve decisions? Wilson and Schooler 
(1991) found that thinking too much (and specifically verbalizing) about choice options 
caused suboptimal decisions. This study found that participants who used “a rate-all” 
approach (rating many relevant decision attributes) required too many mental trade-offs 
which lead to suboptimal decisions. Thinking too little, on the other hand, caused people 
to default to heuristics and intuitive impressions. A balance of effort and flow would 
allow participants to engage in more calculative thinking without feeling overwhelmed.  
An intervention for prosocial behavior must also be appropriately normed, such 
that the desired outcome is an improved decision in relation to a rational norm, rather one 
biased only toward helping behavior. Given the clear examples of scope neglect in 
various real-world prosocial actions, appropriately scaled prosocial action can be 
considered an optimal decision (Olsen, Donaldson, & Pereira, 2004; Slovic, 2007; Slovic, 
Västfjäll, Erlandsson, & Gregory, 2017; Veisten, Hoen, Navrud, & Strand. 2004). For 
pseudoinefficacy, the rational behavior depends upon the context of the scenario. For 
example, when some of the children at risk of death are presented as “unable to be 
helped”, there is not a clear connection between this fact and the “correct” donation 
amount.  However, the inability to save everyone (or to completely rectify an issue)—this 
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fact alone—should not deter prosocial action or depress positive feelings toward 
providing aid to those we can help.  
Metrics of decision satisfaction provide feedback on the decision experience. 
Decision satisfaction is especially important for prosocial behaviors because most 
charitable, humanitarian, and environmental conservation efforts depend on repeat 
altruistic behaviors. Souring a donation experience or annoying potential volunteers 
could exacerbate existing biases that undervalue prosocial behavior compared to stated 
values. Experimenter demand effects are also a concern when the authority that disperses 
subject payments is simultaneously asking for donations to charity within the experiment. 
An ideal intervention can improve decision outcomes while also raising decision 
satisfaction and avoiding demand effects.  
Introspection 
Previous research has explored improving decisions using mindfulness. 
Unfortunately, it is not as simple as instructing people to cogitate to improve 
performance. Many studies of mindfulness require several sessions of training to 
significantly alter thinking patterns (Alfonso, Caracuel, Delgado-Pastor, & Verdejo-
Garcia, 2011; Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; Shapiro, Jazaieri, & Goldin, 2012; de Vibe, 
et al., 2013). Other studies that attempt to induce thinking patterns in the short term have 
found that attempting to induce a deliberative thought process can have no effect on 
performance or even backfire (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006).  
Wilson and Schooler (1991) found that asking subjects to introspect about the reasons for 
a consumer preference caused decreased decision satisfaction, as accessible elements of 
the choices become the focal aspect of the decision, rather than attitudes that were more 
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difficult for participants to articulate. A study of voters found that forcing adults into 
deliberative thought during decision making made no difference in their perceived 
political self-efficacy (Morrell, 2005).  Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, and Glöckner (2009) 
found that instructions to deliberate do not necessarily increase processing but instead 
cause a more thorough information search and repeat investigations of the decision 
factors. Instructions to deliberate may also alter the way emotions are processed. Dickert, 
Slovic, and Sagara (2011) found that empathic and other-focused emotions are disrupted 
during a deliberative mindset, which suppresses empathy-motivated action. The 
intervention tested in the current study combines facets of structured decision making 
with mindfulness, using a structured introspective (SI) task. It is important to compare 
this new experimental condition with a deliberative condition akin to the above studies, to 
test the effect of SI above and beyond instructions for deliberation. 
Because introspection is rooted in the mental process of the individual, reactions 
to the task may vary. Introspection in the context of life-saving scenarios may cause 
people to become more aware of the relevant factors in the scenario that should influence 
their decision, and adjust their responses accordingly. Addressing a life-saving scenario 
where attention is drawn to people in need will involve some level of negative affect. An 
introspective process can divert attention from emotional reactions and thus redirect those 
who struggle with emotional content. An introspective task may be received differently 
by people with varying thinking tendencies. Participants who possess tendencies and 
ability for more analytic thought could benefit greatly by restructuring an emotional 
scenario into a calculative task.  
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Warm Glow 
  Four main outcome variables are explored in this thesis: monetary donations, 
blood donations, decision satisfaction, and warm glow. This section will provide a primer 
on the concept of warm glow and why it is important for understanding prosocial 
behavior.  
First, what is warm glow?  Altruism is an ongoing debate in academic discourse, 
and there is blooming interest regarding the motivations that drive helping behaviors. One 
such motivation for helping others has been documented as a positive feeling, a “warm 
glow,” which arises in conjunction with a prosocial act. This section explores theories of 
warm glow as an experienced phenomenon, the methods used to measure it, and how 
warm glow relates to prosocial behavior.   
When humans help one another, many report a positive feeling that is associated 
with the act. It has been described as a “warm glow,” a “joy of giving,” or a personal 
hedonic benefit that arises as a result of completed prosocial behaviors. Scientific inquiry 
surrounding the warm glow phenomenon has steadily increased. Economic research 
targeting warm glow giving has increased since the early 1990’s, modeling and 
documenting the nature of utility derived from giving (Andreoni, Harbaugh, & 
Vesterlund, 2007; Crumpler & Grossman, 2008; Holländer, 1990; Prisbey, 2013; 
Romano & Yildirim, 2001; Simon, 1993; Stahl & Haruvy, 2006; Yildirim, 2014). 
Applied researchers, such as those designing similar interventions that increase the rate of 
prosocial behavior, have demonstrated particular interest in warm glow as a motivator for 
prosocial action (Ma & Burton, 2016; Giebelhausen, 2017). The psychological literature 
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mentioning “warm glow” offers a wide array of theoretical and operational definitions, 
methods for measurement, and conclusions for behavior.  
Warm glow is a good feeling; it is affective state with a positive nature, such that 
people experiencing warm glow derive some sort of hedonic pleasure. Simply put, giving 
or helping others produces a noticeably good feeling. We understand this phenomenon as 
experienced warm glow (EWG). It is important to distinguish EWG from a related 
phenomenon that is thought to drive prosocial behaviors, anticipated warm glow (AWG), 
or the expectation of experienced warm glow. In other words, sometimes we help others 
because we anticipate and desire to obtain the resulting positive affective state or the 
anticipation of EWG.  
  Much of the economic literature on warm glow giving is vague as to what they 
believe warm glow to be and does not refer specifically to positive affect but instead uses 
the words “benefit,” or “joy-of-giving” (Andreioni 1989; Andreioni, 1990; Harbaugh, 
1998; Ribar, 2000). However, all of these articles consider warm glow to be a “utility” 
for the public that drives action. In other words, warm glow has a hedonic value that 
influences choices of giving. There is some divergence within this body of research if 
warm glow solely results from a cognitive process following a behavior, and/or is an 
unconscious affective response. For example, Dawes and Thaler (1988) refer to warm 
glow (i.e. impure altruism) as a “satisfaction of conscience” (p. 192) that arises from 
meeting one’s own moral standards. Under this definition, conscious reflection that one’s 
action is congruent with a held moral standard is required to experience warm glow. 
Importantly, economic studies of warm glow focus on behavioral warm glow, or a 
behavior that demonstrates giving was motivated by a personal utility, and does not focus 
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on the psychological experience of the individual (see Konow, 2007). This becomes an 
issue for comparability between disciplines, discussed in the methods review section 
below. 
Psychological studies are quick to define warm glow as an emotional response to 
a behavior, but also include unconscious reactions such as positive empathy via 
emotional contagion (e.g. feeling good about giving because of mimicking the recipient’s 
joy).  However, even in the psychological and applied literature (environmental, 
marketing, blood donation), where authors more explicitly define warm glow as a feeling, 
there is disagreement about its boundaries as a positive emotional experience. Some 
researchers argue that seeking warm glow and avoiding guilt in helping situations are two 
sides of the same “mood management” coin (see Basil, Ridgway, & Basil, 2008; Cialdini 
et al., 1997; Dickert, Sagara, & Slovic, 2011), while other evidence suggests that these 
are purely separate constructions (Erlandsson, Jungstrang, & Västfjäll, 2016).  
The wide-spread evidence of warm glow giving has led some researchers to argue 
that it may be a psychological universal, similar to other emotions like happiness and 
sadness.  Akin et al. (2013) found that prosocial spending (i.e. making donations) was 
reliably related to subjective well-being. Through a series of correlational and 
experimental findings in 136 countries, they conclude that giving produces a predictable, 
emotional benefit among humans worldwide and that this fleeting benefit was related to 
overall subjective well-being. Meier and Stutzer (2008) go as far as to argue that overall 
life-satisfaction may be dependent on giving or volunteering behaviors. They found 
that—among a German sample of volunteers—intrinsic motivators for prosocial action 
produced the most enduring personal reward, frequent volunteers report significantly 
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higher life-satisfaction, and stopping volunteering resulted in a significant drop in 
reported life-satisfaction. However, more research is needed this in area exploring warm 
glow as an enduring well-being rather than a fleeting emotion and how this emotional 
experience might be additive to well-being over time.  
While definitions of EWG in the literature differ on several other factors 
discussed below, we can accept a common principle: under the conditions in which warm 
glow occurs, the resulting experience or anticipation of the experience is affective and a 
subjectively positive experience for the individual. This basic assumption may be the only 
shared quality amid the literature on warm glow. However, two related phenomena—
empathy and self-image—are important to understand how warm glow related to 
prosocial behavior.  
One common driver of prosocial behavior is an empathic reaction to another’s 
suffering. First, it is important to unpack the concept of empathy if we are to understand 
how it is related to warm glow and giving. At its most basic level, empathy involves an 
inference of mind-state among individuals. Empathy is a socially cognitive process and 
requires the cognitive ability to infer another’s mind-state (i.e., having a theory of mind). 
de Waal (2008) theorized that  the emotional contagion at the heart of all empathic 
responses. He goes on to argue that a person’s ability to “feel for others” to generate an 
empathic emotion has evolved due to our skilled emotional communication abilities.  
Further, he finds evidence that other species demonstrate empathy when they can 
discriminate the self vs. the other.   
Substantial evidence exists for the empathy-altruism hypothesis: generosity is 
affectively motivated by selfless empathy for people in need (Batson, 1981; Batson & 
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Shaw, 1991). However, the process by which the experience of empathy translates into a 
prosocial behavior is less understood. Basil et al.  (2008) argue that empathy allows an 
individual to assess a situation as if it were affecting them. However, different models of 
empathy can lead to different paths so which an assessment can be made. Under a model 
of empathy as a product of the emotional contagion, we can draw on Stueber’s (2017) 
four steps for empathy to occur: 
1) Some other person manifests a behavior, such as grimacing  
2) In my own experience this behavior is caused by a mental state of 
pain 
3) I implicitly assume that others share similar psychological causes 
to mine 
4) Therefore: their grimacing is caused by a mental state of pain 
 
Empathy acts to create a mental environment for us to assess a threat and 
determine a sense of need for the other. By imagining another’s suffering, the cause of 
that suffering gains a level of realism and evaluability that may not otherwise be 
considered. This generated sense of need then guides our responding behavior. 
How empathy interacts with warm glow will depend on one’s definition of EWG 
but the evidence for the empathy-altruism hypothesis gives us an indication that 
experiencing feelings for others is a critical piece in feeling good about helping them. In 
other words, empathy may be a necessary component for warm glow to occur in that it 
allows the possibility of connecting with another’s suffering (and the ending of that 
suffering). Pictures of emaciated children are powerful stimuli for producing empathy 
and, when paired with a charitable solicitation, they provide a clear signal that our actions 
can lessen another’s suffering. If we receive information about the efficacy of our 
actions, warm glow can be affected (e.g. pseudoinefficacy), indicating that empathic 
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responses to the lessening of another’s suffering can also guide the degree to which we 
can experience positive affect from the helping behavior.     
An alternative view in opposition to the empathy-altruism hypothesis argues that 
prosocial behavior is more cognitively motivated through identification with others 
(Cialdini et al., 1997). More specifically, what we call empathy and personal distress are 
mediated through a “oneness” experienced between the self and the other. This 
perspective paints a more egocentric perspective of prosocial action such that our 
motivation to help others is really driven by a sense of threat to similar others, or others 
who we experience as closer to ourselves. Recent research has explored oneness as an 
individual difference measure that has been predictive of prosocial behavior is several 
experiments (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012; Penner et al., 2005).  
Hoffman (1981) similarly argued that empathic arousal motivates helping 
behavior primarily by relieving a negative emotional state. In other words, empathy 
makes us feel others’ suffering and helping can reduce our personal suffering. Taking this 
perspective, warm glow may be closer to relief than to pleasure, by reducing another’s 
suffering. More research is needed to distinguish which perspective of altruism and 
empathy can explain EWG. This question has particular relevance for understanding 
warm glow in contexts other than helping humans. For example, if empathy is a 
necessary condition for warm glow to occur, can we experience it for non-human or 
inanimate objects such as the environment? 
When considering whether to help others, people often reflect inwardly before 
acting. For example, when considering whether or not to give money to the needy, we 
might decide to give because not giving would tarnish the image of ourselves as a “good 
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person”. We might also consider that giving would improve or maintain a positive self-
image. In this case, warm glow can be understood as maintaining a positive self-image. 
Costa-Font, Jofre-Bonet, and Yen (2012) define warm glow as a “moral satisfaction.” 
They assert that,in the context of blood donation—“blood donated enters an individual’s 
utility function...positively through (warm glow) the effect that it has on her self-image or 
identity” (p. 8). While this definition doesn’t explicitly include a positive emotion 
associated with warm glow, it implies that the personal benefit received from giving is 
inherently linked with the perception of the self.  
Other economists stress the social aspect of giving. Abbott, Nandeibam, and 
O’Shea (2013) argue that warm glow is critically dependent on social norms (defined as 
“ideal forms of behavior to which individuals try to conform”; p.11). In this model, 
experienced warm glow arises from self-reference to a moral ideal. The degree to which a 
person experiences warm glow depends upon the gap between the prosocial action and 
the perception of social norm about the action (Brekke, Kipperberg, & Nyborg, 2007; 
Brekke, Kipperberg, & Nyborg, 2010; Glazer & Konrad, 1996; Lacetera & Macis, 2010; 
Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Winterich & Barone, 2011).  For example when 
considering whether to give money to a homeless person, we first consider what the 
social norm is for giving to the homeless. This norm might depend upon and differ by 
culture, societal structure, and homelessness presence. If we decide to give to the 
homeless person, we consider whether our action matches the implied social norm. The 
closer our action is to that norm, the greater the warm glow experienced.  
De Young (1986) argues that when this gap is bridged (i.e. when we act in a way 
in accordance with our moral ideal), a specific type of satisfaction is experienced. While 
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De Young did not go as far as to label this satisfaction as “warm glow,” a factor analytic 
study found that people readily recognize this satisfactory feeling in relation to giving..  
An empirical study of this model found that when social norms are accounted for, warm 
glow did not predict recycling behavior, indicating that warm-glow-motivated-giving can 
be entirely explained or mediated by the social norms that an individual attends to (Abbot 
et al., 2013). However, warm glow was not directly measured in this study and was 
deduced to be present due to the increase in time spent recycling not accounted for by 
efficiency. Schwartz (1973) similarly found that when norms are made more less salient 
(from subtle to explicit) people’s helping behavior (organ donation sign-ups)—scaled to 
the degree to which the norm is salient, although warm glow was again not measured as a 
competing motivator. Through this lens, warm glow is generated from a cognitively 
reflective process, in contrast with the psychological literature that portrays warm glow 
as affective, rising purely out of the act of (or in anticipation of) giving 
 Tracey, Robins, and Tangney (2012) describe warm glow as falling under a 
general cognitive function of self-esteem management that draws upon moral 
consequences to determine value. In their framework, warm glow falls under the 
umbrella of “authentic pride” or an emotion that is self-directed and achievement 
oriented, but not leading to egotistical ends. This is in contrast to “hubristic pride” which 
refers to a self-promoting feeling that is purposed to assert dominance and establish 
power. The authors hypothesize (with some preliminary findings) that an empathic 
response mediates whether one experiences authentic versus hubristic pride. In other 
words, in order to feel warm glow, the self- directed emotion must coincide with an 
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empathic experience; the absence of empathy would support hubristic pride, or a giving 
solely for the good feeling of increased self-status.  
Given the wide variety in defining the concept of warm glow, it is no surprise that 
the methodologies used to operationally define and measure warm glow also vary widely. 
Amid the literature on warm glow, there was a stark distinction between the way it is 
operationalized in psychology journals and in economic journals. More specifically, 
virtually none of the papers in economics directly measured warm glow (save for 
collaborative projects with psychologists; e.g. Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007). 
Instead, the experience of warm glow is implied from behavior of giving. The standard 
practice among these studies is that of a “rule out diagnosis.” In other words, these 
articles typically present a model, then essentially account for every other possible 
motivation for giving (e.g., pure altruism or status); the behavior that remains must be 
motivated by warm glow (personal utility).  
Most studies directly measuring warm glow rely on self-report. However, the 
questions used in self-report varied systematically with the definitions provided by the 
authors. Papers that defined warm glow as simply an affective response tended to use 
self-report items related to affective states, such as using the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1998), feeling good about one’s self, feeling emotionally positive, or “warm 
inside”(Aknin Hamlin, & Dunn, 2012; Ferguson et al., 2012; Rosenhan, Salovey, & 
Hargis, 1981; Sonnetag & Grant, 2012). Studies that linked warm glow to perceptions of 
the self tended to use ratings of satisfaction or esteem enhancement, such as “I would feel 
satisfied if I helped” or a rating of job satisfaction (Donegani, McKay, & Moro, 2012; 
Erlandsson, Björklund, & Bäckström, 2014, Erlandsson, Jungstrand, & Västfjäll, 2016;). 
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Other research using self-report used some combination or some other operationalization 
that did not match their definition. For example, Giebelhausen and Chun (2017) defined 
warm glow as a “positively affective state” but then measured warm glow using four 9-
point semantic differential that asked the degree to which the participant felt 
ethical/unethical, in the right/in the wrong, wicked/virtuous, and ashamed/proud.  
Of the few studies that did not use self-report, psychophysiological measures were 
employed. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) has been used to study warm 
glow and two studies found that forced giving (i.e. induced warm glow) activated the 
same reward center—the nucleus accumbens—to the same degree as free choice giving 
(Genevsky, Västfjäll, Slovic, & Knutson., 2013; Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007). 
Other research in environmental action found a literal warm glow effect in the form of 
temperature perception: people who acted in an environmentally-friendly manner 
perceived a higher temperature in the room in which the experiment was conducted 
(Taufik, Bolderdijk, & Steg, 2014). These studies are promising hints that prosocial 
behavior may produce measureable physiological markers that can help researchers 
supplement or enhance self-report ratings of warm glow. Further research is needed to 
determine the replicability and extent that warm glow produces a universally detectable 
physiological response. 
How does warm glow develop as a correlate of prosocial behavior? 
Developmental researchers can help elucidate how warm glow arises in children as a 
motivator for prosocial action and if this translates to adulthood. Is warm glow closer to a 
learned behavior such that we see positive effects from giving or helping others as 
children and the drive to adhere to social norms propagates the continuation of the 
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behavior? Alternatively, warm glow could be an intrinsic result from helping others; we 
are simply “programmed” to feel positive feelings after helping others, perhaps as a result 
of the emotional contagion (de Waal, 2008).  At what developmental stages do either of 
these explanations apply? The limited evidence suggests that warm glow can be 
affectively innate but also has the propensity to be learned. Aknin et al. (2012) found 
evidence for warm glow in children under the age of two by observing and coding their 
demonstrated happiness from helping a puppet monkey, irrespective of the puppet’s 
reaction to receiving the help. The children gave treats to the puppet and demonstrated 
nearly identical happiness as to receiving treats themselves.  
Early studies of child prosocial behavior found that children are cognizant of 
EWG as a result of giving and there was evidence that children showed increased 
motivation to help others after watching a confederate express positive emotion after 
giving (Harris, 1968; Midlarsky & Bryan, 1967). Schnall, Roper, & Fessler (2010) found 
that warm glow is contagious in adults: seeing others experience positive emotion from 
giving increased one’s own propensity to give. Further research is needed to parse how 
and at what age warm glow giving can be learned and at how young of an age warm glow 
can be experienced. The ages and stages at which warm glow giving occurs can help 
elucidate the interplay of warm glow with other developmental milestones (e.g. theory of 
mind or language acquisition).  
The influence of warm glow on prosocial action may change across the lifespan. 
Ferguson et al. (2012a & 2012b) found across two studies that only long-term blood 
donors exhibited warm glow as a significant motivation to donate. It is not clear if warm 
glow was learned by these experienced donors (i.e. it increased over time, creating a 
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feedback loop of donation behavior) or the experienced donors were simply more 
sensitive to the affective rewards of giving from the start. Sonnetag and Grant (2012) 
found that the positive boost in affect from giving may not (only) be immediate. In a 
repeated-measures design they found that prosocial behavior during the day predicted a 
positive affect boost at bedtime which boosted feelings of self-efficacy.  
  The environmental psychology literature is ripe with empirical evidence of warm 
glow as a prosocial motivator, particularly because environmental efforts usually have 
little personal reward and there is not a clear recipient of the helping behavior. Individual 
sensitivity to warm glow cues can predict warm glow-giving in environmental decisions. 
Nunes and Schokkaert (2003) found that respondents who demonstrated more sensitivity 
to warm glow (i.e. self-reported that they experienced or were motivated by a positive 
emotional reward) were willing to pay more for a costly, but effective environmental 
program. A field study by Menges, Schroeder, and Traub (2005) found that warm glow 
drove willingness to pay (WTP) for green energy in Germany and the WTP scaled 
linearly with warm glow, a finding also documented in economic lab studies (Chilton & 
Hutchinson, 2000). In a hotel field study, Giebelhausen and Chun (2017) found that 
voluntary green programs (i.e. towel reuse) increased guest satisfaction, especially when 
combined with incentives of virtue (i.e. an appeal to virtuous environmental behavior) 
and vice (i.e. an unhealthy treat) and that this satisfaction rating was moderated by 
experienced warm glow. This research offers practical insights in to the effects of 
different types of incentives offered when green options are available.  
While anticipated warm glow is clearly a strong driving factor toward prosocial 
action, it is surprisingly sensitive to cues within the environmental and mental contexts. 
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Abbott, Nandeibam and O’Shea (2013) found that warm glow is a driving factor in 
recycling programs, but only when monetary rewards are absent. They also find that 
warm glow is enhanced by non-monetary rewards, when autonomy and competence are 
high. These findings complement findings in literature pertaining to prosocial behaviors 
directed at humans: Västfjäll, Slovic, and Mayorga (2015) found that warm glow giving 
is sensitive to contextual factors, such as the presence of larger problem that we might not 
be able to help. In a series of studies, a robust difference was discovered: people 
experience less warm glow for giving to an individual when they are made aware of 
people that cannot be helped.  
Thus, warm glow is closely tied to our concept of self-efficacy. A longitudinal 
study of prosocial behavior found that self-efficacy can be the crux of cyclical trends in 
prosocial behavior (Capara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012). The results suggest that 
people are less likely to engage in prosocial behavior when they feel they are incapable of 
dealing with strong-emotional content (e.g. “it’s just too hard to look at) and are unable to 
establish appropriate actions for meeting those needs. The authors assert that self-
transcendental values (such as universalism and benevolence) can improve self-efficacy 
beliefs and thus promote warm glow giving. McFarland et al. (2012) have developed an 
individual difference measure (the “All humanity is my in-group” scale) for measuring 
self-transcendental values that may moderate warm glow giving and drive prosocial 
action. More research is needed to establish a causal link between self-transcendental 
values and prosocial behavior through warm glow, as the direction of the relationship 
between values and warm glow is still unclear.  
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When we feel we can be effective in helping, the warm glow benefit is greater 
than when we feel less efficacious, even when the helping behavior is held constant. 
Cognitive and economic research has found a moderating effect of attention on prosocial 
self-efficacy and warm glow-giving. Rosenhan, Salovey, and Hargis (1981) found that 
when attention is directed to the self, self-efficacy becomes predictive of prosocial action, 
although their study was limited by a small sample size.  
Monetary or extrinsic rewards can “contaminate” the affective rewards from 
giving by drawing attention away from others and prosocial action: Costa-Font, Jofre-
Bonet and Yen (2013) found that cash payment for blood donations reduced warm glow, 
especially among women and older donors (demographic characteristics that also 
predicted the greatest amount of prosocial action). Cash incentives cause people to 
misattribute intrinsic benefits from giving (like warm glow), perhaps by drawing the 
focus away from the recipient, and redirecting affect toward a tangible object.  
The specific information and framing we receive about the recipients of prosocial 
behavior can influence anticipated warm glow, and thus prosocial action. Andreoni and 
Rao (2011) found that when potential recipients of giving provided a social cue of need 
(i.e. literally asked for aid), altruistic behavior increased in a dictator game.  In a study of 
microlending investments in impoverished areas, Allison, McKenny, and Short (2013) 
found that specific political rhetoric cues prime the anticipation of warm glow and affect 
funding rates: rhetoric that downplayed neediness reduced funding rates while rhetoric 
associated with blame for the individual’s misfortune and pressing concerns increased the 
rate of microloan funding. These results suggest that understanding the reasons for 
another’s misfortune may be an important factor that donors consider in determining the 
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responsibility that the needy individual has for their situation. Ferguson and Flynn (2016) 
found that experienced warm glow can be influenced by manipulating the frame of 
possible actions, or the “moral relativism” of the actions. Using a dictator game, they 
varied the possible actions to either donate/not or donate/take, implying that if you don’t 
donate the money, it will go to your pocket. Results indicated that subjects experienced 
significantly more warm glow with the inclusion of the take option over just donate or 
not but interestingly this frame also resulted in less actual giving.  
Not all types of giving are equal for warm glow. Complementing the blood 
donation literature noted above, economic modeling studies have found that donations of 
time (i.e. volunteering) are found to be driven more by warm glow than are monetary 
donations (Clary et al., 1998; Lilley & Slonim, 2014). Meirer and Stutzer (2008) 
hypothesize that volunteering provides social and psychological benefits that may 
reinforce the experience of warm glow. Volunteers in their study generally engaged in 
helping for social interaction, development of skills, or using new equipment that fosters 
an intrinsic benefit of work enjoyment. The authors also claim that warm glow can be 
understood in a long-term sense of life-satisfaction, such that the personal reflection on 
previous efficacious actions are more likely to have intrinsic value when they also benefit 
others. Similarly, Omoto and Snyder (1995) found that long-term AIDS volunteers are 
driven by an affective reward to support self-esteem. Warm glow acted as a signal for 
these volunteers that volunteering improved their self image.   
 Conversely, other research in the economics of charitable giving has found that 
AWG is dependent on giving or not giving—like an on/off switch—rather than scaled to 
degree of impact. Null (2011) found that subjects exposed to a giving matching program, 
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were more likely to make several smaller donations to less efficient charities, even at the 
expense of up to 25% gift matching, because of the short-lived, repeated warm glow 
benefit (although the authors did not address the concept of fairness among their 
participants in distributing funds more evenly). In this sense, warm glow can drive 
inefficient giving and Null concludes, “If these choices are indicative of how donors 
would respond to changes in the social benefit of their gifts in the real world, the results 
bode ill for efficiency of resource allocation across charities.” (p. 464) 
 There are other instances in which warm glow is not associated with increased 
giving and may predict lower rates of prosocial behavior. Imas (2014) found that warm 
glow giving has clear limits when put at odds with personal benefit. In a real-effort task 
(hand squeezes), people were willing to work for the benefit of others more than for 
themselves for small incentives, but not large incentives. The consistently measured 
difference between small and large incentives appears to be about two dollars. Mayo and 
Tinsley (2009) studied whether warm glow was a significant motivator for wealthy 
donors. They found evidence that the self-serving attribution bias and fundamental 
attribution error may cause the rich to fail to receive a warm glow benefit from giving to 
others, by downplaying others’ misfortune as due to poor merit, rather than bad luck. 
Other studies have investigated the contextual factors of a helping situation that might 
downplay the role of warm glow in giving in favor of other emotional or situational 
motivators. Andreoni (1995) found that people were more prosocial when giving was 
framed as such (moving personal funds to a charity) than when it was framed as a 
negative (earning money by moving public goods to a private one), even when the 
outcomes are identical. In other words, it is not sufficient for warm glow that we avoid 
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doing bad; some form of (actual or imagined) positive action must be perceived by the 
agent.  
Erlandsson, Jungstrand, and Västfjäll (2016) found that warm glow was trumped 
by feelings of guilt when personal responsibility was low in relation to the cause of the 
problem, when the task requires low effort, or when the victim expects to be helped.   
This finding complements classic research on social influence and diffusion of 
responsibility as crucial contexts that define bystander response to emergencies 
(Bickman, 1972; Fischer et al., 2011).   Only when the individual feels some level of 
responsibility for the good behavior does warm glow emerge as predictive as guilt for 
action.  An uninvolved observer is unlikely to experience warm glow by proxy.  
Warm glow is thus inherently linked with emotions that pertain to other people, 
such as empathy and guilt. Warm glow is also closely related to our personal identity and 
sense of self-efficacy. Warm glow shows clear evidence as a motivator for prosocial 
action, but the degree to which it is anticipated and experienced can sensitive to 
contextual factors of the prosocial behavior.  Warm glow may provide a more stable way 
to predict cross-domain differences in prosocial behavior, if it correlates with multiple 
prosocial actions or alternatively, as a predictor for the frequency at which people engage 
in prosocial behavior.   
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CHAPTER III  
GENERAL STUDY DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
The two studies contained in this dissertation were conducted with the goal of 
testing a structured introspection task as an intervention for experienced 
pseudoinefficacy. The first study is in the domain of charitable giving, replicating 
previous findings, and exploring moderating effects of individual differences on 
pseudoinefficacy. Study two adapts the findings and design from the first study to a new 
context: blood donation. This study is a conceptual replication in that instead of 
“children not helped” that act to demotivate, negative affect is attempted to be induced 
by a negative image and highlight of the need.  
 Pseudoinefficacy is hypothesized to decrease helping motivations and anticipated 
warm glow by producing negative emotions from thinking about others that cannot be 
helped and by viewing negative stimuli. Introspection is predicted to affect the 
processing of the emotional stimuli by drawing attention away from emotional aspects 
of the scenario and offering a format for evaluating and comparing the factors in the 
decision space. By reframing the scenario in the manner, it is expected that participants 
will be less susceptible to bias caused from negative affect and “drop in the bucket” 
thinking.  
Structured introspection supplies a set factors for consideration and asks 
participants to rate the degree to which the factor should influence their decision. 
Structured introspection is compared to an unstructured deliberation task in which 
participants asked to think about the factors that should influence their choice but are 
offered no guidance as to which factors to consider. These conditions are also compared 
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to a control condition in which participants are offered no added instruction between the 
scenario and outcome variables.  
 The design and structure of the two studies are nearly identical. Both studies use 
a 3 x 2 between subjects design (see Figure 1). The columns note the intervention 
condition (Structure Introspection, Deliberation, and Control). The rows indicate the 
pseudoinefficacy manipulation (Appeal alone or with stimuli designed to induce 
pseudoinefficacy).  
Figure 1. Factorial design of studies 
 
The arrows in the condition boxes indicate the expected direction and size of the effect 
on the outcome variables. First, looking at the control, a main effect of pseudoinefficacy 
is predicted such that the inclusion of this stimuli will decrease anticipated warm glow 
and prosocial behaviors. A main effect of structure introspection is also predicted such 
that structured introspection will increase anticipated warm glow and prosocial 
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behaviors. An interaction is predicted between the two manipulations such that SI will 
be most effective when the pseudoinefficacy stimuli are present, such that it will 
increase warm glow and prosocial behaviors beyond control and SI with the standard 
appeal. Lastly deliberation is expected to have either no effect (in the case of the appeal 
alone) or have a negative effect such that warm glow and prosocial behaviors are 
depressed beyond control.  The formal hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The pseudoinefficacy stimuli will cause decreased anticipated 
warm glow from helping, replicating the findings from Västfjäll, Slovic, 
and Mayorga, (2015). 
Hypothesis 2a: The guided introspection condition will result in greater 
anticipated warm glow and increased rate and degree or prosocial 
behaviors. 
Hypothesis 2b: The effect of the introspection task will interact with 
pseudoinefficacy condition such that it will be more effective when 
participants are reminded about the greater need they cannot help. In 
other words, the differences in anticipated warm glow and prosocial 
behaviors between the introspection condition and the other two 
conditions will be larger when pseudoinefficacy stimuli are included 
compared to when no such information is included.  
Hypothesis 3a: The deliberation condition will offer no increase over the no-
instruction control condition in warm glow ratings or prosocial behaviors. 
Hypothesis 3b: The deliberation condition may result in even lower warm glow 
and prosocial behaviors particularly in the pseudoinefficacy condition.  
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CHAPTER IV  
STUDY 1: INTROSPECTION INTERVENTION IN CHARITABLE DONATIONS 
Rationale and Exploratory Hypotheses 
 In many situations that involve helping others, there are broader needs that cannot 
be met from a single prosocial act. For example, if you are approached about making a 
donation to an environmental conservation organization, you are inherently aware that 
your donation will not solve the issue in its entirety. From this perspective, many are 
drawn in to “drop-in-the-bucket” style thinking where the efficacy of a prosocial action 
appears lessened by the mere presence of the “unhelped” need. When the expressed need 
originates from identified individual or an affect-rich stimulus, the negative affect from 
this stimulus effectively mix with any anticipated positive affect from the prospect of 
giving, diminishing perceived efficacy, and consequentially lowering the chances of 
helpful behavior (Västfjäll, Slovic, & Mayorga, 2015). The current study seeks to 
intervene in this affective mixing process by drawing attention to the cues producing 
affect in the environment (i.e. the helped target, and the unhelped targets).  
Improving decision making through the use of decision aids, intervention, or 
priming is not a new development, but applying these tools to address bias in charitable 
decision making is a novel solution. For some decisions, normative behavior may be 
easily defined, such as choosing the option that maximizes payout for the self. Improving 
decisions in prosocial contexts does not necessarily imply greater overall donation 
amounts, as donation decisions (including the amount donated) may be based on personal 
importance and moral conviction, rather than an objective normative standard. Thus, 
46 
improving decisions in prosocial contexts may result in increased overall donations, but 
should focus on reducing bias and satisfaction of the decision maker as well.  
Introspective thinking is a “lite” version of structured decision making, that 
prompts the decision maker to informally consider and evaluate factors of the decision 
environment (structured introspection) or deliberate on the factors themselves without 
evaluation (unstructured introspection). By slowing down decision makers and forcing 
them to briefly evaluate the relevant decision information, introspection is hypothesized 
to decrease the influence of “affective lures” or factors of the decision environment that 
appear attractive (or unattractive) because of overreliance on the affective reaction to the 
stimuli, rather than because they possess an objective (dis)advantage.  
 In the current study, introspection is applied to charitable giving by instructing 
participants to rate how much the benefit to the child should influence their decision to 
help, as well as how much the “unhelped child” should influence their decision. In a 
deliberative condition, no guidance on the factors is provided and participants are simply 
asked to think deeply about the decision factors for 30 seconds. It is predicted that guided 
introspection will cause people to more readily identify the unhelped child as an 
irrelevant or less important emotional stimuli in their decision and thus report greater 
warm glow, be less likely to be demotivated from action, and will express greater 
decision satisfaction, compared to people in a control condition that does not introspect 
and a deliberation condition (see Figure 2). It is possible that unguided introspection will 
result in more varied responses because it relies on the decision maker to identify the 
source of the negative affect as irrelevant. But, among those that identify the “unhelped” 
as an irrelevant source of affect, the effect on warm glow, motivation and decision 
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satisfaction may be similar to the guided introspection. In addition to these predictions, 
individual differences are explored as moderators for pseudoinefficacy and the effect of 
the intervention.  
Figure 2. Conceptual model for study 1. Adapted from Butts, Lunt, Freling, and Gabriel 
(2019) 
 
Solicitations to needy causes often utilize emotional content to increase attention 
to the cause. As such, these solicitations can involve a myriad of emotions that can 
influence the decision to donate. We may experience emotions toward the victim, toward 
the requester, or toward related organization(s), and all or none of the above. Mayorga 
(2012) found that emotion regulation moderated reactions to help when a group of 
unhelped individuals was highlighted in a charitable decision context. Specifically, 
people who reported more difficulty in regulating their emotions also reported being 
more demotivated by unhelped children, donated less, and felt less warm glow from 
donating (Mayorga, 2012). Conversely, people who found their emotions more 
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manageable tended to be motivated more by the unhelped children.  This finding suggests 
that each individual’s emotional response to these images can differentially influence the 
motivations to help, when an opportunity is given. Seeing a child in dire need that we 
cannot help can undoubtedly cause emotion in most individuals. But to some these 
stimuli could be overwhelmingly sad, others may simply ignore it or fail to recognize the 
origin of the feeling, or it may bring about a greater sense of need for action. Emotion 
regulation ability helps explains reactions to the affect-rich stimuli, for individuals who 
experience an emotional reaction to the stimuli. Conversely, more immediate responses 
to the stimuli might be determined by people’s general tendency to rely on or more 
readily consider emotional cues in an environment as relevant sources of decision 
information. Thus, an individual difference in emotional reactance or cognitive reflection 
may be a stronger predictor of when the “unhelped” are influential in the decision to 
donate and shape the associated emotions. 
 The current study seeks to explore other possible individual difference moderators 
of the pseudoinefficacy effect as well as the intervention described above. Developments 
in cognitive psychology and decision theory have resulted in several measures that seek 
to capture one’s processing style (i.e. more emotional vs. more calculative). A well-
known measure of processing style is the Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999) which uses self-reports of one’s preference for experiential thinking (e.g. 
“I like to rely on my intuitive impressions) vs rational thinking (e.g. “I enjoy intellectual 
challenges”). Since these relationships are exploratory, no formal hypotheses will be 
made. However, one can speculate that a tendency for deliberative thinking may cause 
people to be less influenced by unaided children beyond reach than those with a tendency 
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to rely on their emotions. People with rational thinking tendencies may be thus aided by 
both introspection conditions more than experiential thinkers, because they possess a 
readily available framework for deliberating on the relevant decision factors.  
Another moderator that may be crucial for evaluating context in charitable 
decision is emotional intelligence, or the one’s individual ability to perceive, feel, 
understand, and manage one’s own (and others’) emotions (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2003). In other words, one’s natural ability to identify and recognize personal 
emotions and identify the sources of those emotions will be crucial to identifying the 
unhelped children as a contextual factor rather than objective evidence of inefficacy. 
Drawing on the Cascading model of emotional intelligence (Joseph & Newman, 2010), 
emotional intelligence can influence cognitions and behaviors in donation contexts 
through an emotional process of 1) emotion perception, 2) emotion understanding, and 3) 
emotion regulation. I hypothesize that pseudoinefficacy for unhelped children occurs 
when the donation stimuli are processed as negative emotional content, the content is 
interpreted as relevant to the decision, and the emotion is not regulated (or is regulated in 
a maladaptive manner).  Conversely, the unhelped children may not negatively influence 
the decision if the stimuli are not perceived as emotional, the source of the emotion is 
understood as irrelevant, or the emotion is regulated. The facets of emotional intelligence 
will be operationalized using the Difficulty in Emotion Regulation subscales: Awareness 
(emotion perception), Non-acceptance of emotional responses (emotion understanding), 
and Strategies (emotion regulation).  
The cascading model of emotional intelligence is be tested to explore the affective 
process that predicts experiencing pseudoinefficacy. This causal model will be tested 
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using three mediation analyses, comparing across the pseudoinefficacy conditions. The 
model would predict that individual differences in emotion perception (DERS: 
Awareness and Clarity) will predict greater emotional understanding (Non-acceptance of 
emotional responses) which will predict emotion regulation (Impulse control & 
Regulation strategies), finally predicting anticipated warm glow (and donation frequency, 
decision satisfaction; see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Cascading model of emotion processing predicting outcome variables in Study 
1 
 
Tendencies toward rational or experiential thinking will be explored as a possible 
moderator for both the pseudoinefficacy effect, and the effect of introspection on 
anticipated warm glow (WG), donation behavior, and decision satisfaction. Participants’ 
ratings of the Rational Experiential Inventory, as well as the Emotional Reactivity Task 
(ERT) (Skagerlund, Forsblad, Slovic, & Västfjäll, 2019) will be scored and tested as a 
moderator in the inference tests for each of the formal hypotheses.  
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Method 
Participants. Six-hundred and five participants (49.9% identified as female, 
73.2% Caucasian, Mage= 32.94) were recruited from Prolific Academic (www.Prolific.ac) 
for an online survey. Participants were screened on residency (U.S. only) and age (18+).  
Design. The study was advertised as a 10-15 minute online survey on “Emotion 
and Decision Making” and participants were paid $3 for completing the survey. After 
digitally signing a consent document, participants read a short background paragraph on 
the country of Yemen and were provided with a map of the Middle East, highlighting the 
location of Yemen. Next, a 20-second charitable appeal video 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dF2zXogCFw) was displayed detailing the famine 
crisis in Yemen and the effort Save the Children, a non-profit providing immediate aid to 
children in foreign countries, made to provide aid. The video contains footage of an 
emaciated child, highlighting a story about “Baby Nusair,” with text on the screen and 
low music. To decrease the chance of participant skipping the video, the survey would 
not allow progression for 20 seconds. Half of the participants (n= 301) were assigned to 
the pseudoinefficacy condition and were given an additional picture (see Appendix 1) and 
the phrase, “Countless more children are at risk of starvation as Yemen edges toward the 
brink of famine. Some children, like those shown in the picture below, are forced to 
flee due to violence and are often not able to receive aid.” This text was placed just 
below the video, above the picture.  
 Participants were randomized into one of three intervention conditions: structured 
introspection, deliberation, or a control condition. In the structured introspection 
condition, participants were asked to “think more deeply about the factors…that might 
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influence your decision to help the charity”. Participants then rated two factors (three in 
the pseudoinefficacy condition) on their perceived degree of normative influence, on a 5-
point scale of “not at all” to “extremely”. The factors rated included “The contextual 
information about the war and famine in Yemen.” “The need of the children currently at 
risk, like baby Nusair.” and (for the pseudoinefficacy condition) “The information of the 
many children who are unable to receive aid.” In the deliberation condition, participants 
were also asked to  “think more deeply about the factors…that might influence your 
feelings toward helping the charity” and were given 30 seconds to think. The survey was 
locked and progressed automatically after 30 seconds.  In the control condition, 
participants simply continued on to the next section. Participants next completed ratings 
of warm glow, a semi-hypothetical donation, affective ratings surrounding the scenario 
and donation, individual difference measures, and lastly a demographic questionnaire.  
Materials. Materials for Study 1 are presented in Appendix A. The phrase and 
experience of “warm glow” may not be familiar to most people. Thus, warm glow was 
defined for participants and operationalized with a two-step question. Participants were 
first given a definition of warm glow and were then asked to briefly recollect a time when 
they might have “experienced a good feeling from doing something good for someone 
else”. Participants were then asked to imagine that they were able to give money to a 
trusted aid organization to help the children in Yemen and how much warm glow they 
might experience on a 0-100 scale if they were to donate. Response format consisted of a 
two-step procedure: Five responses were provided in the first step (0-20 low or no warm 
glow, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100 high to extreme warm glow). Participants were then 
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asked to further specify their warm glow between the range they picked in the second 
step (e.g. to specify a number between 21 and 40). 
For the donation task, participants were informed of a random drawing among the 
survey participants for a prize of $100. The participants could then choose a number 
between 0 and $100 of their potential winnings that they could donate to Save the 
Children to help the children in Yemen. At the end of the data collection, a random 
participant was chosen and their prize (minus the donation sent to Save the Children) was 
awarded.   
Participants rated several statements regarding their feelings (sadness, sympathy) toward 
the target of the video (Baby Nusair). Participants who donated money rated their 
anticipated guilt if they didn’t donate, while participants who did not donate any of their 
prize winnings rated their experienced guilt from not donating.  
Participants also rated their decision satisfaction toward their donation (“How 
satisfied are you with your decision regarding the donation to Save the Children?”), the 
perceived efficacy of their donation (“How much do you think your donation would help 
children like baby Nusair?”), and the degree to which the donation opportunity  made 
themselves feel better (“How much did the opportunity of donating money make you feel 
better?”). To measure a possible effect of emotional reactance, a 6-item measure was 
used with statements such as “I felt annoyed by being shown the charity appeal” and “I 
felt ‘moved’ by the appeal” (reverse scored). Participants were asked to reflect on 
humanitarian crises and rate the degree to which “drop in the bucket” thinking or being 
reminded of those we are unable to help influences their motivation to help others on a 4-
point scale, as well as the direction of the effect (demotivates or motivates more).  
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Participants lastly made ratings of how negative they found the video (and the added 
picture in the pseudoinefficacy condition) on a 11=-point scale from -10 (very negative) 
to 0 (neutral).  
Three individual difference measures were included to explore a possible 
moderating influence on the pseudoinefficacy effect or intervention. The Rational-
Experiential inventory, designed to measure tendencies for different modes of thinking is 
a 40-item battery of statements in which participants rate the statements as “definitely 
false” or “definitely true” of themselves on a 5-point scale. After scoring, the measure 
provides four subscales on two dimensions of ability and engagement (rational ability, 
rational engagement, experiential ability, and experiential engagement). To study the 
process of emotion regulation in the scenario, the Difficulty in Emotion Regulation Scale 
(DERS) was administered. The DERS provides 6 subscales (Nonacceptance of Emotional 
Responses, Difficulty in Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior, Impulse Control 
Difficulties, Lack of Emotional Awareness, Limited Access to Emotion Regulation 
Strategies, and Lack of Emotional Clarity).  This scale measures emotion-related 
experiences and behaviors using a 5-point frequency scale from almost never (0-10%) to 
almost always (91-100%). Lastly, the Emotion Reactivity Task measures individual 
tendencies to rely on the affect heuristic. This measure asks participants to rate several 
behaviors (15 behaviors in the shortened version used here) for perceived risk and 
benefit. Person-level correlations are then calculated between risk and benefits of the 
behaviors and this individual correlation score was used in subsequent analyses.  
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Results 
Descriptive and Preliminary Analyses. Table 1 displays the means and standard 
deviations of the outcome variables and scenario reactions, split by condition and totaled. 
There were some notable and unexpected differences among the variables between 
conditions. One can observe a general trend of greater values across all variables in the 
pseudoinefficacy condition, compared to control. Additionally, collapsing across the 
pseudoinefficacy manipulation, the structured introspection condition resulted in slightly 
less warm glow (M = 58.54, SD = 26.63), donations (M = 46.84, SD = 34.99), and 
perceived efficacy (M = 4.17, SD= 1.78), compared to the other two condition. This 
difference may be a result of the blunted responses in the structured introspection (SI) 
appeal-only condition. Participants in the SI appeal-only condition reported lower 
average anticipated warm glow (M = 55.13, SD = 27.43) from the prospect of donating 
and a lower average donation (M = 41.15, SD = 33.68) than the other conditions. This 
result is explored later in the inference tests.  
Just looking at the introspection conditions, the rated values of the decision factors 
differed slightly. When viewing the video charity appeal alone, introspective participants 
rated the influence the contextual information of the war and famine in Yemen with a 
mean of 3.6 (SD = 1.11) while the need of the victim as 4.16 (SD = 0.96). In the 
pseudoinefficacy condition, the contextual information had a slightly higher mean of 3.75 
(SD = 1.04) and a similar rating of the victim’s need (M = 4.17, SD =0.99). Neither of 
these ratings differed significantly between the pseudoinefficacy condition and appeal-
only condition (t(198) = -0.99, p=.07, t(198) = -0.12, p=.80, respectively.  
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Table 1. Study 1 Outcome Variables Means (SD) by Condition 
 
 Warm Glow Donation Sadness Sympathy Mood increase Guilt 
Decision 
Satisfactio
n 
Perceived 
Efficacy 
 Range 0-100 $0-100 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 
Appeal 
only 
Structured 
Introspection 
55.13 
(27.43) 
41.15 
(33.68) 
5.47 
(1.62) 
5.81 
(1.61) 3.86 (1.9) 
4.38 
(2.18) 
5.47 
(1.46) 
4.05 
(1.99) 
Deliberation 59.91 
(28.84) 
48.95 
(33.28) 
5.76 
(1.45) 
6.02 
(1.32) 
4.21 
(1.98) 
5.02 
(2.07) 
5.76 
(1.29) 
4.44 
(1.84) 
Control 60.25 
(28.14) 
45.41 
(33.42) 
5.47 
(1.52) 
5.85 
(1.43) 
4.11 
(1.86) 
4.44 
(2.08) 
5.55 
(1.43) 
4.24 
(1.55) 
Total 58.52 
(28.16) 45.26 (33.5) 
5.57 
(1.53) 
5.89 
(1.45) 
4.07 
(1.91) 
4.62 
(2.12) 5.6 (1.39) 
4.25 
(1.8) 
Apeal + 
Pseudo 
Structured 
Introspection 61.68 (25.6) 52.1 (35.5) 
5.76 
(1.35) 
6.06 
(1.24) 
4.52 
(1.76) 
5.08 
(1.84) 
5.88 
(1.16) 
4.27 
(1.56) 
Deliberation 63.08 
(26.16) 
49.69 
(34.13) 
5.76 
(1.47) 
6.09 
(1.3) 
4.34 
(1.89) 
4.86 
(2.05) 
5.85 
(1.26) 
4.36 
(1.87) 
Control 60.13 
(27.75) 
46.76 
(36.03) 
5.74 
(1.49) 
6.05 
(1.39) 
4.03 
(2.05) 4.4 (2.32) 
5.87 
(1.24) 
4.47 
(1.74) 
Total 61.65 
(26.43) 
49.58 
(35.18) 
5.75 
(1.43) 
6.07 
(1.3) 4.3 (1.91) 
4.79 
(2.09) 
5.87 
(1.21) 
4.37 
(1.72) 
Total 
Structured 
Introspection 
58.54 
(26.63) 
46.84 
(34.99) 
5.62 
(1.49) 
5.94 
(1.43) 
4.21 
(1.85) 
4.74 
(2.04) 
5.69 
(1.32) 
4.17 
(1.78) 
Deliberation 61.47 
(27.53) 
49.32 
(33.62) 
5.76 
(1.46) 
6.05 
(1.31) 
4.28 
(1.93) 
4.94 
(2.06) 5.8 (1.27) 
4.4 
(1.85) 
Control 60.19 
(27.88) 
46.06 
(34.62) 5.6 (1.51) 
5.95 
(1.41) 
4.07 
(1.95) 
4.42 
(2.19) 5.7 (1.35) 
4.35 
(1.65) 
Total 60.07 
(27.34) 
47.41 
(34.38) 
5.66 
(1.48) 
5.98 
(1.38) 
4.19 
(1.91) 4.7 (2.11) 
5.73 
(1.31) 
4.31 
(1.76) 
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In comparison, participants in the pseudoinefficacy condition rated the influence of the 
pseudoinefficacy information in between the two other factors (M = 3.87, SD = 1.06). 
Table 2 displays the percent of participants who donated, split between the between-
subjects conditions. Donation frequency was consistent across conditions, with all 
conditions falling between 80-90% of the sample donating at least some amount to the 
charity.  
 
Table 2. Percent Donating to Charity by Condition 
 
  
Did not 
donate Donated n 
Appeal only 
Structured Introspection 16.7% 83.3% 96 
Deliberation 12.6% 87.4% 103 
Control 18.1% 81.9% 105 
Total 15.8% 84.2% 304 
Appeal + 
Pseudoinefficacy 
Structured Introspection 14.4% 85.6% 104 
Deliberation 10.0% 90.0% 100 
Control 15.5% 84.5% 97 
Total 13.3% 86.7% 301 
Total 
Structured Introspection 15.5% 84.5% 200 
Deliberation 11.3% 88.7% 203 
Control 16.8% 83.2% 202 
Total 14.5% 85.5% 605 
 
Variable correlations are displayed in Table 3, with the Cronbach’s alpha on the 
horizontal for scale variables. As expected, anticipated warm glow and donation were 
significantly correlated (r = .30, p<.001). Interestingly, the ERT measure was negatively 
correlated with all of the outcome variables such that a higher score (i.e. a more positive 
correlation between risk and benefits of risks) was associated with lower ratings of warm 
glow, lower donation amounts, and lower perceived efficacy. Warm glow and donations 
were also positively correlated with Experiential Ability (r = .14, p<.001; r =. 10, p =  
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix of Study 1 Variables    
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 1. Warm Glow -                             
2. Donation .298** -              
3. Sadness .512** .343** -             
4. Sympathy .504** .330** .822** -            
5. Mood 
increase .611** .337** .479** .446** -           
6. Guilt .505** .436** .470** .467** .537** -          
7. Decision 
Satisfaction .140** .220** .166** .126** .247** 0.061 -         
8. Perceived 
efficacy .524** .285** .399** .381** .631** .467** .229** -        
9. ERT -.208** -.149** -.128** -.177** -.115** -.197** -0.051 -.128** -0.74  (0.21)       
10. DERS -0.024 -0.001 -0.019 -0.021 -0.041 0.073 -.210** -0.037 .142** 
19.59 
(25.29) 
   .84 
     
11. REI- RA -0.041 -0.040 -0.021 -0.005 -0.078 -0.076 .179** -0.073 -.109** -.496** 
3.80 
(0.72) 
.88 
    
12. REI- RE -0.057 0.031 -0.009 0.012 -.111** -0.069 .122** -.086* -.103* -.327** .731** 
3.76 
(0.76) 
.86 
   
13. REI- EA .144** .099* .156** .169** .148** .085* .144** .131** -.161** -.190** .125** 0.074 
3.34 
(0.76) 
.89 
  
14. REI- EE .218** .168** .226** .237** .209** .148** .139** .186** -.182** -0.050 -0.056 0.004 .818** 
3.34 
(0.79) 
.88 
 
15. Appeal 
Aversion -.388** -.189** -.386** -.388** -.363** -.275** -.217** -.404** .236** .149** -0.057 -0.016 -.158** -.209** 
1.86 
(0.49) 
.70 
 
Note: *p≤.05, **p≤.01. Mean (SD) and Cronbach’s α of scale measures on the diagonal.   
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.015, respectively) and Experiential Engagement (r = .22, p<.001; r = .17, p<.001, 
respectively) from the REI measure. The DERS was not associated with warm glow or 
donation but showed a negative correlation with decision satisfaction (r=-.21, p<.001), 
such that those with more difficultly with their emotional experiences were also less 
satisfied with their decision. The DERS subscales, not included in the table, were also 
correlated with the outcome variables. Subjects scoring higher in Non-acceptance of 
Emotional Experience was associated with a greater donation amount, r = .10, p = .012. 
Warm glow showed a small negative correlation with Awareness, such that subjects who 
reported greater difficulty in recognizing emotional states in themselves was associated 
with lower anticipated warm glow, r = -.09, p = .03.  
Hypothesis Tests. Hypotheses tests were completed using stepwise multiple linear 
regression with planned orthogonal contrasts codes. Step 1 included the covariates Age, 
Gender (binary coded), and Education. Step 2 entered the contrast codes. Comparisons 
captured by planned contrasts are presented in Table 4 for each of dependent variables 
(warm glow, donation, donated or not, decision satisfaction).  
Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect of pseudoinefficacy such that it would depress 
outcome variables. This hypothesis was not supported by the data.  Mean Warm glow, 
donation, and rate of donation showed no significant differences between the control 
(appeal-only) and experimental condition (WG β = -0.06, p = .11; Donation β = 0.06, p = 
.32, Rate of Donation exp(β) = 0.90, Wald = 1.46, p = .23).   A significant difference was 
found for decision satisfaction (F(8, 586) = 32.95, p = .01, R2=.03), but in the opposite 
direction as predicted: the condition containing the appeal video and pseudoinefficacy 
stimuli resulted in significantly greater reported donation decision satisfaction (M = 5.87, 
60 
SD = 1.21) than with the charity appeal video alone (M = 5.6, SD = 1.39), (β =  -0.10, p = 
.01). Hypothesis 2a was also not supported, predicting a main effect benefit from the 
structure introspection over control. The guided introspection condition showed no 
significant difference in mean warm glow, donation amount, donation rate, or decision 
satisfaction when compared to deliberation (contrast 2: Warm glow β = -.05, p = .27; 
Donation β = -0.03, p = .47, Satisfaction β = -.04, p = .29, Rate of Donation exp(β) = 
0.81, Wald = 1.95, p = .16) or control alone (contrasts 3; Warm glow β = -.03, p = .54; 
Donation β = 0.02, p = .64, Satisfaction β = 0.04, p = .79, Rate of Donation exp(β) = 1.04, 
Wald = 0.09, p = .77) or when these two conditions are combined (contrast 5; Warm glow 
β = -0.00, p = .94; Donation β = -0.04, p = .34, Satisfaction β = -.01, p = .76, Rate of 
Donation exp(β) = 0.91, Wald = 1.45, p = .23).   
Table 4. Standardized Contrast Coefficients (SE) for Outcome Variables in Study 1 
Contrast Warm Glow Donation 
Decision 
Satisfaction 
Donated or 
not†  
1. Appeal only vs w/ 
Pseudoinefficacy -0.059 (1.11) 
-0.063 
(1.40) 
-0.104 
(0.05)** 
0.901 
(0.12) 
2. SI vs D -0.046 (1.36) -0.032 (1.71) -0.039 (0.07) 
0.831 
(0.15) 
3. SI vs C -0.027 (1.37) 0.006 (1.72) -0.01 (0.07) 1.046 (0.14) 
4. SI & D vs C 0.004 (1.93) -0.026 (0.99) -0.01 (-0.01) 
0.912 
(0.08) 
5. SI vs Others 0.042 (0.78) -0.015 (0.99) -0.029 (0.04) 
0.954 
(0.08) 
6. SIc vs SIp 0.069 (1.94) 0.096 (2.46)* 0.091 (0.09)* 
1.089 
(0.20) 
7. D vs C -0.02 (1.36) -0.039 (1.71) -0.02 (1.36) 
0.794 
(0.15) 
8. SIp VS Others 0.027 (0.49) 0.063 (0.62) 0.053 (0.02) 0.998 (0.05) 
Note. SI= Structured Introspection, D=Deliberation, C= Control, SIp=Structured 
Introspection (Pseudoinefficacy condition); *=p<.05, **=p≤.01; † Logistic regression, 
coefficients are expressed as odds ratio multiplier exp(β).  
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Hypothesis 2b, predicting an interaction between the intervention and 
pseudoinefficacy manipulations, was partially supported. The thinking task manipulation 
did interact with the pseudoinefficacy manipulation for donation amount but not in the 
predicted manner (See Figure 4). The effect of the structured introspection was 
moderated by the presence or absence of the pseudoinefficacy stimuli (contrast 6): when 
viewing the appeal alone and completing the introspection task (with no pseudoinefficacy 
information), participants donated significantly less of their potential lottery winnings (β 
= 0.10, t = 2.34, p = .02) and were less satisfied with their decision (β = 0.08, t = 2.05, p 
= .04) than when the information about the unaided children was present in the scenario 
and introspection task. This relationship was not observed for warm glow (β = 0.07, t = 
1.68, p = .09) or rate of donation (exp(β) =  1.08, Wald = 0.14, p = .71).  
A test of the deliberation condition compared to control revealed that Hypothesis 
3a was not supported. The control and deliberation conditions did not significantly differ 
between warm glow, donation amount, rate of donation, or decision satisfaction (contrast 
7; WG β = -0.02, t = -0.50, p = .62; Donation β = -0.05, t = -1.19, p = .23, Satisfaction β = 
-.03, t = -0.80, p = .43, Rate of Donation exp(β) = 0.78, Wald = 2.86, p = .09). 
Consequentially, exploratory Hypothesis 3b was not supported. There was no evidence 
that the deliberation condition differed or that this effect interacted with the 
pseudoinefficacy manipulation.  Although no formal hypothesis was stated a priori, the 
SI and Deliberation conditions share a required extended thinking session that could 
differ from the control condition. However, there was no main effect found for the 
thinking conditions (SI and D) compared to control (contrast 4; Warm glow β = 0.00, t = 
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0.07, p = .94; Donation β = -.04, t = -0.95, p = .34, Satisfaction β = -.01, t = -0.30, p = 
.76, Rate of Donation exp(β) = 0.91, Wald = 1.45, p = .23).  
Figure 4. Study 1 mean donations amount by condition 
 
Note: Error bars represent -1/+1 SE 
 
Exploratory Analysis. Several exploratory analyses were conducted in accordance with 
the predicted moderators of the pseudoinefficacy effect. The first set of analyses used 
multiple mediation models, testing a process model constructed from the cascading 
model of emotional intelligence. Three mediation models were run with PROCESS v3.3 
by Andrew Hayes for SPSS Version 23, using 5000 bootstrapped samples. The process 
model dictates that emotional perception will affect outcome variables through emotional 
understanding and emotion regulation. This model was conducted for three outcome 
variables: warm glow, donation amounts, and rate of donation.    The results from the 
models did not support the cascading model of emotion intelligence in charitable decision 
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making.   The models explained little variance in the outcome variables (warm glow 
R2=.01, donation R2=.02, rate of donation Nagelkerke R2=.02). The bootstrap confidence 
intervals indicated that the coefficient of the indirect effect of emotion perception through 
emotion understanding and emotion regulation was not significant for warm glow (β = -
.06, SE=.08, 95% CI = -.22,.17), donation amount (β = -.19, SE = .10, 95% CI = -
.39,.01), or rate of donation (β = -.01, SE = .01, 95% CI = -.03,.01). These path 
coefficients were also not moderated by the pseudoinefficacy manipulation. 
The second planned exploratory analysis tested for moderation effects of three 
individual difference measures: the REI, the DERS, and ERT. Interaction terms were 
constructed for use in regression to test if the effect of the pseudoinefficacy manipulation 
was moderated by any of the three individual difference measures.  Multiple regression 
was used with three control variables (Age, Gender, Education) and contrast codes testing 
the interaction. The results did not support a moderation hypothesis.  
The pseudoinefficacy manipulation did not interact with the ERT for donation 
amount (β = 0.07, t = 0.57, p = .57), or rate of donation (exp(β) =1.05, SE = .17, p = .76).  
A significant interaction term was found for the ERT with the pseudoinefficacy condition 
for warm glow (β = 0.25, t = 2.00, p = .046). However, a scatter plot of the interaction 
revealed the effect to be driven by a single outlier on the ERT measure, with a positive 
correlation between risk and benefit of 0.75 (the average correlation was -.74). Removing 
this outlier weakened the interaction term to well above p<.05 significance level (β = 
0.01, t = 0.32, p = .75). The pseudoinefficacy manipulation did not interact with scores on 
the DERS for warm glow (β = 0.003, t = 0.02, p = .96), donation (β = 0.05, t = 0.93, p = 
.35), or rate of donation (exp(β) =1.00, SE = .002, p = .07).  Lastly, the REI emotional 
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ability and REI emotional engagement were tested as moderators of pseudoinefficacy.  
Experiential ability did not significantly interact with the pseudoinefficacy on the 
anticipated warm glow (β = 0.15, t = 0.83, p = .40), donation amount (β = -0.12, t = -0.67, 
p = .50), or rate of donation (exp(β) =1.04, SE = .07, p = .59).  Similarly Experiential 
Engagement was not a significant moderator of the manipulation for warm glow (β = 
0.05, t = 0.25, p = .80), donation amount (β = 0.03, t = 0.14, p = .89), or rate of donation 
(exp(β) =0.65, SE = 0.74, p = .29).   
A final exploratory analysis was conducted to compare the predictive power of 
the individual difference measures on the outcome variables, controlling for 
demographics and reported frequency of donation behaviors outside of the survey.  First, 
a baseline model was fit with the covariates Age, Gender, Education, and reported 
frequency of donation behaviors (never donate, occasionally, infrequently, regularly) 
predicting each of warm glow, donation amount, and rate of donation. Next, separate 
models were run (due to multicollinearity concerns) including the three individual 
difference measures in the second step (Table 5).    
In model Step 2.1, the REI subscales were entered as predictors of warm glow. 
This model explained significantly more variance than the base model for warm glow, 
F(8, 585) = 7.62, R2 = .09, R2Δ =.04, p<.001. Particularly, Experiential Engagement was 
a significant predictor of warm glow (β = .29, t = 4.00, p<.001), while the other subscales 
were not predictive of warm glow. This result suggests that people higher in a tendency 
to engage with emotional related aspects of their environment predicted greater reported 
anticipated warm glow from donating. Comparatively, the DERS subscales did not 
explain significantly more variance than the base model (F(10,584) = 3.90, R2 = .06, R2Δ 
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=.008, p = .56)  and none of the subscales were individually predictive of anticipated 
warm glow. The ERT scores predicted significantly more variance than the base model, 
F(5,583) = 3.90, R2 = .09, R2Δ =.036, p < .001. There was a significant negative 
relationship between the ERT and warm glow such that the more negative a correlation 
between risk and benefit someone scores, the more anticipated warm glow they report 
from the prospect of the donation.  
For donation amount, a similar pattern was discovered (F(8,585) = 7.88, R2 = .10, 
R2Δ =.03, p = .001) with a greater tendency for experiential engagement predicting higher 
donation amount (β = .21, t = 2.90, p = .004). Adding the DERS subscales also explained 
significantly more variance in the donation amount model, (F(10,584) = 6.37, R2 = .10, 
R2Δ =.03, p = .003). The Goals subscales relationship suggests that greater difficulty in 
engaging in goal directed behavior when experiencing emotions (“When I’m upset, I 
have difficulty focusing on other things.”) predicts greater donation amounts, β = 0.13, t 
= 2.33, p = .02.The strategy subscale was negatively related to donation amount such that 
those who have more limited emotion regulation strategies donated less than those who 
were more skilled in emotion regulation, β = -0.19, t = -2.46, p = .014.  Lastly, the DERS 
Non-Acceptance subscale was positively related to donations such that individuals who 
were less accepting of emotion experiences donated less than those who were more open 
to emotion experiences β = 0.18, t = 3.55, p < .001. Correlation scores from the ERT 
were similarly predictive of donations as they were with warm glow, F(5,583) = 10.88, 
R2 = .09, R2Δ =.02, p = .001. Again, a negative association was found such that the more 
negative a correlation between risk and benefit, the greater amount donated, β = -0.14, t = 
-3.39, p = .001. 
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Logistic regression was used to model donation (0=did not donate, 1=donated). 
The omnibus test of the model found that adding the REI subscales predicted 
significantly more variance, χ2 (1)=5.37, p = .02, Nagelkerke R2 = .13. Again the 
Experiential Engagement was the only significant predictor such that a greater tendency 
to engagement in emotion within the environment predict a greater chance of donating, 
exp(β) = 1.95, SE = 0.28, p = .019. Similar to warm glow, the DERS subscales did not 
explain additional variance beyond the control measures, χ2(1) = 8.65, p = .19, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .14. The subscale Non-Acceptance was mildly predictive of chance of 
donation such that individuals who were less accepting of emotion experiences donated 
less often than those who were more open to emotion experiences, exp(β) = 1.07, SE = 
0.03, p = .03. The ERT again explained variance beyond the control measures, 
χ2(1)=5.37, p = .02, Nagelkerke R2 = .13. Again, a negative association was found such 
that that the more negative a correlation between risk and benefit someone scores, the 
greater chance of donation, exp(β) = 0.29, SE = 0.51, p = .02.  
Exploratory Analyses. Several moderating variables were tested in an effort to explain the 
significant differences in donations and decision satisfaction between the structured 
introspection conditions (contrast 6 in Table 4).  The difference in donations between 
these two conditions was not moderated by scores on the ERT (β = 0.00, t = .01, p = .99), 
DERS (β = 0.02, t = 0.39, p = .83), REI-RA (β = -0.00, t = -.02, p = .99), REI-RE (β = -
0.01, t = -.05, p = .96), REI-EA (β = -0.00, t = -.02, p = .98), or REI-EE (β = -.05, t = -
.30, p = .77). Nor did these measures moderate the difference in decision satisfaction 
(ERT β = -0.09, t = -0.65, p = .52; DERS β = -0.02, t = -0.38, p = .71; REI-RA β = -0.25, 
t = -1.17, p = .24, REI-RE β = -0.23, t = -1.09, p = .28, REI-EA β = 0.15, t = 0.83, p = 
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.41; REI-EE β = 0.19, t = 1.10, p = .27). Psychological distance from the appeal was the 
only significant variable that moderated the difference in donations between these two 
conditions, on β = 0.23, t = 2.16, p = .03. This result suggests that when participants 
introspected about the video appeal only, this increased psychological distance from the 
scenario and decreased the amount donated, although this relationship did not explain the 
difference in decision satisfaction,  β = 0.06, t = 0.53, p = .60. 
Table 5. Linear Regression of Study 1 Outcome Variables on Individual Difference 
Measures 
Step  Warm Glow Donation Donated or Not † 
1 Gender  (1=male, 2=female) 0.09* 0.05 0.96 
 Education -0.13** -0.04 0.81* 
 Age -0.04 -0.14** 0.97** 
 Donation Frequency 0.21*** 0.27*** 2.05*** 
 R2 0.05 0.07 0.11 
2.1 Rational Ability 0.04 -0.10 0.73 
 Rational Engagement -0.09 0.09 1.08 
 Experiential Ability -0.13 -0.09 0.69 
 Experiential 
Engagement 0.29*** 0.21** 1.95* 
 R2  0.09 0.10 0.15 
2.2 DERS Goals 0.000 0.13* 1.06 
 DERS Impulse 0.07 -0.07 0.97 
 DERS Awareness -0.07 0.01 1.00 
 DERS Strategy -0.10 -0.19* 0.95 
 DERS Clarity 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
 DERS Non-
Acceptance 0.04 0.18*** 1.07* 
 R2 0.063 0.10 0.14 
2.3 ERT -0.18*** -0.14*** 0.29* 
 R2  0.087 0.09 0.13 
 
Note. *=p<.05, **=p≤.01; † Logistic regression, coefficients are expressed as exp(β).  
Further exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate the relationships 
between the individual difference measures and the stated reactions to the stimuli, and the 
self-rated motivational differences from the pseudoinefficacy information, Table 6 
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contains the Pearson correlations. Affective reactions to the video appeal were 
uncorrelated with individual differences measures (ERT r =0.00, p = .97; DERS r = -
0.04, p = .28; REI- RA r = -0.02, p = .61; REI-RE r = -.08, p = .06; REI-EA r = 0.04, p = 
.69; REI-EE r = -0.03, p = .50). Rated affect toward the pseudoinefficacy picture was 
significantly related to the ERT (r = 0.16, p =.007) and the REI-EE subscale (r = -.12, p = 
.04) but was uncorrelated with the other measures (DERS r = -.09, p = .12; REI- RA r = 
0.01, p = .92; REI-RE r = -.12, p = .05; REI-EA r = -0.05, p = .44).  Within the 
pseudoinefficacy condition, the more participants rated the added information as 
influential on their decision, the higher scores exhibited on the REI-EA (r = 0.15, p 
=.008) and REI-EE (r = 0.20, p =.001).  These two subscales were also related to degree 
to which people rated the information at motivating/demotivating (REI-EA r = 0.16, p 
=.005; REI-EE r = 0.24, p <.001) such that those who express greater experiential ability 
or experiential engagement also rated the pseudoinefficacy stimuli as more motivating. 
The ERT was also related to this question such that less reliance on affect as information 
(more negative individual correlation) was related to rating the pseudoinefficacy 
information as motivating (r = -.18, p =.002).   
The relationship among the motivation influence variables and Experiential 
Ability and Experiential Engagement did not replicate among the whole sample when 
asked about how generally “drop in the bucket thinking” might influence their choice (r = 
-.01, p =.91, r = 0.02, p =.62, respectively). This more general measure was instead only 
related to the DERS (r = 0.11, p =.007) such that greater reported difficulty in emotion 
regulation predicted more self-rated influence on prosocial action.  In regard to 
motivation, again higher scores Experiential Ability and Experiential Engagement were 
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Table 6. Pearson Correlations between Individual Differences and Motivations 
  1. 2. a 3. a 4. 5. 6. 7. a 8. 9. 10. 12. 13. 14. 
1. Warm glow -             
2. Pseudo-
Influence 0.45** -            
3. Pseudo-
motivate 0.41** .51** -           
4. Gen Pseudo-
Influence 0.11** 0.14* 0.12* -          
5. Gen Pseudo-
Motivate 0.25** 0.27** 0.35** -.09* -         
6. Affect- 
Video -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -        
7. Affect- 
Pseudo Picture -.18** -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.73** -       
8. DERS -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.11** -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -      
9. ERT -.23** -0.05 -0.18** -0.04 -0.09* -0.00 .16** .16** -     
10. REI- RA -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -.50** -.10* -    
12. REI- RE -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -.33** -.10* .73** -   
13. REI- EA .14** .15** 0.16** -0.01 .14** 0.04 -0.05 -.19** -.16** .13** 0.074 -  
14. REI- EE .22** .20** 0.24** 0.020 .15** -0.03 -.12* -0.05 -.18** -0.06 0.00 .89** - 
Note: *p≤.05, **p≤.01. Most correlations have sample size N=604, an=301 for pseudoinefficacy condition.
70 
related to greater motivation from “drop in the bucket” thinking (r = .14, p <.001, r = 
0.15, p <.001, respectively). The ERT was slightly related to rated motivation, in the 
direction that more reliance on affect as information predicted more motivation (r = -.09, 
p =.03). 
Discussion 
This study sought to replicate previous research on the pseudoinefficacy effect in a one-
shot charitable decision. In addition, structured introspection was tested as an 
experimental intervention for the influence of negative affect and perceived inefficacy in 
charitable contexts.  Overall, the hypotheses were not supported. No main effect was 
observed from the pseudoinefficacy manipulation on the outcome variables. Post-hoc 
analysis did not reveal any significant moderators of the effect. It is possible the 
pseudoinefficacy information was overshadowed by the negative frame of the video 
appeal. The picture of the children who were unable to receive aid was rated more neutral 
(less negatively) than the video appeal. 
The hypothesis tests for the introspection condition comparisons revealed small 
differences in donation amounts and decision satisfaction, but not for warm glow or rate 
of donation. The differences observed suggested that the effect of the structured 
introspection was moderated by the presence of the pseudoinefficacy information. This 
interaction was best explained by differences in psychological distance from the appeal. 
When the video was shown by itself and participants were instructed to only reflect on 
the context of the appeal and the benefit to the recipient, participants distanced 
themselves from the message of the appeal and donated less money. 
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Conversely, when participants also introspected about the children who were unable to 
receive aid, no such distancing was observed and donations were slightly above the 
control. A closer look at open-ended question for participants to detail the thoughts that 
they experienced during the task revealed that introspecting on the video appeal alone 
caused participants to feel manipulated and the participants expressed distrust with the 
charity. This finding has important implications for future test of introspective tasks. The 
content and type of the factors that subjects are asked to introspect about can be invoke 
resistance to the task or the message conveyed. No individual difference measure could 
help explain this finding.  
The exploratory regressions with the individual difference measures revealed that 
the REI, DERS, and new ERT measures were related to feelings surrounding charitable 
action and donation behavior.  Several regressions investigated the influence of the 
individual difference variables on the outcome variables warm glow, donation amount, 
and rate of donation. Outcome variables were best predicted by the REI subscale 
Experiential Engagement, or willingness to engage in affective experiences predicts 
increased prosocial behaviors. Interestingly, the ERT was also predictive of these three 
outcome variables. This finding suggests that these individual differences measures are 
capturing variance from a shared psychological phenomenon related to  the degree to 
which affective stimuli are processed within a decision context. This is supported by the 
correlations with the influence and motivation questions in Table 6. The ERT may 
provide a measure of one’s naturally tendency to rely on affect as information. Future 
research will be needed to tease apart how the human affective systems interact with 
attention for determining the relevancy of emotional stimuli to prosocial decisions.  
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CHAPTER V 
INTROSPECTION INTERVENTION IN BLOOD DONATIONS 
Rationale and Hypotheses. Research in blood donation has found that perceived 
self-efficacy is a significant and robust predictor of willingness and intentions to donate 
blood, such that people who do not donate indicate that they are not confident in their 
ability to complete the donation (Giles, McClenahan, Cairns, & Mallet, 2004). Several 
studies have found that self-efficacy is negatively associated with a fear of needles or an 
irrational fear of becoming sick from donating. Another study found that the most 
reported factor for the avoidance of blood donation is simple laziness. While laziness is a 
possible explanation, it is also possible that it is a constructed response to explain a 
pattern of diminished self-efficacy from internal negative affect regarding blood 
donation. In other words, when asked, people aren’t consciously aware of the influence of 
negative affect on self-efficacy, the easiest explanation for not being a donor is that they 
simply “haven’t gotten around to it.”  
Much current literature on blood donation neglected to study affect toward blood 
donation as an influential force on willingness and intentions to donate. Blood donation 
has inherent negative physical experiences for the self that are readily available in 
people’s mind when considering to donate (i.e. needle poke, fatigue), not to mention the 
negative connotation of harm that blood possess. However, what is not often easily 
accessible in these decisions are the life-saving benefits to a specific recipient and the low 
risk of physical complication (studies report objective risk during blood donation to be 
somewhere between .01%-.0.8% ;Crocco & D’Elia, 2007; Sorensen, Johnsen, & 
Jorgensen, 2008).  
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An open question in the literature is whether feelings and behaviors toward blood 
donation exhibit the same biases as in the monetary donation literature. The process that 
is predicted to drive diminished self-efficacy in blood donations is that negative affect 
dampens anticipated warm glow, and consequentially diminishes the perceived efficacy 
of the donation. Similar to the “unhelped child” in study 1, the negative affect from 
visualizing blood donations and attending to the overall need for blood donation blends 
with positive emotions from the perceived good from donating and thus demotivates 
intentions to donate. If negative affect from the blood donation processes is dampening 
the anticipated positive emotion benefits from donating, this could result in the 
perception of inefficacy. In addition, the current study again explores the introspection 
intervention that shares the design of Study 1.  An introspective task may allow people to 
perceive the source of their negative affect, and adjust their feelings toward donating.  
Actual blood donations can be difficult to document—especially in a single-
session experiment—due to the lack of availability of operating donation centers or blood 
drives. This study will consist of two-parts to allow time for participants to complete a 
donation. Additionally, blood donation can take a significant amount of planning and 
time to accomplish. Thus, the Theory of Planned Behavior will be used as a model to 
capture shifts in intentions and attitudes toward blood donation, as base rates of donation 
behavior will likely be low. Figure 5 describes the proposed structural model, drawing on 
the Theory of Planned Behavior. The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) framework 
(Ajzen, 2002; Armitage & Conner, 2001) uses a multiple mediation model for behavioral 
change including the exogenous variables of attitude evaluation, perceptions of social 
pressure and of norms, self-efficacy, and identity. These factors directly influence 
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intentions and indirectly donation behavior. Note that the model proposes that each of 
these factors can influence intentions independently. The introspection manipulation will 
influence the path starting from Attitudes to Perceived Efficacy, thus indirectly 
influencing donation behavior. Introspecting on the factors that influence choice will 
cause more people to consciously observe the source of their negative affect, and 
consequentially will have more positive feelings toward blood donation and greater 
perceived efficacy toward donating. While Subjective Norms and Identity of blood 
donation will be measured in this study, there are no specific predictions on how the 
introspection might influence the paths between norms and the other variables. 
Figure 5. Proposed TPB model for blood donation 
  
This study will screen on the basis of blood donor status (not qualified, regular 
donor, infrequent or one-time donor, or non-donor). Regular donors and non-qualifying 
donors would not benefit from an intervention to increase donor response. Infrequent, 
one-time, or non-donors will be invited to complete an online survey. This study again 
manipulated the scope of the issue by providing a pseudoinefficacy information section 
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for half of the participants. Again, the introspection manipulation is utilized to investigate 
potential benefits for blood donors in introspecting on the factors related to blood 
donation.  
Method 
Participants. Four hundred and fourteen participants were recruited from Prolific 
Academic for a two-part online survey. Participants were screened on residency (U.S. 
only) and age (18+).  
Design. The study was advertised as a two-part (10 minutes for part 1, 5 minutes 
for part 2) online survey. Participants were paid $2 for completing the first survey and $1 
for the second. Because a blood donation motivation intervention would not be applicable 
to regular donors or people who are known to be ineligible, participants were also 
screened on donor status. Participants who identified themselves as having “never 
attempted to donate blood or plasma before,” “donated blood or plasma once,” or “have 
donated several times but not regularly,” were invited to participate in the first survey. 
Thirty additional participants from the sample reported in the survey comments that 
medical complications prevented them from donating blood and were excluded from the 
second survey invitation and further analysis. This resulted in 384 participants for survey 
1 (43.5% identified as female, 70.2% Caucasian, Mage= 32.82). After digitally signing a 
consent document, participants rated their feelings toward donating blood themselves, on 
a 21-point scale from “Very Negative -10” to “Very Positive +10”. Next, participants 
were presented with a short story and a picture about a child recipient of blood donation 
who is dependent on regular blood transfusions. Participants were randomly assigned to 
the pseudoinefficacy condition (n= 185) or control (n=199). In the pseudoinefficacy 
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condition, participants were given an additional picture of someone donating blood (see 
Appendix 2) and 3 bullet-point facts regarding the need for blood donation, “4.5 million 
Americans will a need blood transfusion each year”, “43,000 pints: amount of donated 
blood used each day in the U.S. and Canada.”, and “Someone needs blood every two 
seconds.” This text was placed just below the picture. The control condition saw only the 
picture and narrative concerning the child recipient.  
 Participants were then randomized into one of three intervention conditions: 
structured introspection, deliberation, or a control condition. In the structured 
introspection condition, participants were asked to “think more deeply about the factors 
that might influence your feelings toward donating blood.” Participants then rated two 
factors (three in the pseudoinefficacy condition) on how much they thought each factor 
should influence their feelings toward donating blood next week, on a 5-point scale of 
“not at all” to “extremely”. The factors rated included “Physical discomfort associated 
with the act of donating blood”, “The physical benefit to the recipient of the donation”, 
and (for the pseudoinefficacy condition) “The facts provided about blood donation need”. 
In the deliberation condition, participants were also asked.  “Before continuing, we would 
like you to think more deeply about the factors that might influence your feelings toward 
donating blood” and were given 30 seconds to think. The urvey locked and progressed 
automatically after 30 seconds.  In the control condition, participants simply continued on 
to the next section. Participants next completed ratings of warm glow,  affective ratings 
surrounding the scenario and donation, ratings according to the Theory of Planned 
Behavior, and lastly a demographic questionnaire.  
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Materials. A copy of the materials for study 2 can be found in Appendix B. 
Participants rated warm glow in a similar two-step fashion as in study 1: After reading a 
definition of warm glow, participants rated how much warm glow they might experience 
on a 0-100 scale if they went to a blood drive and donated blood. Five responses were 
provided in the first step (0-20 low or no warm glow, 21-40, 41-60, 61-80, 81-100 high to 
extreme warm glow). Participants were then asked to further specify their warm glow 
between the range they picked (e.g. specify a number between 21and 40). 
To alleviate concerns of experimenter demand effects, participants were 
instructed, “Now we would like you to consider the possibility of donating blood yourself 
in the next week while answering the following questions. Again, we will not be asking 
or requiring you to commit to a blood donation. There are no right or wrong answers in 
this section, we are only interested in your opinion and beliefs.”  
Next participants completed the TPB measures, presented in a random order. The 
measure included sections on Attitude, Subject Norms, Control Behaviors, Self-efficacy, 
Perceived Behavioral Control, Identity, and Donation Intentions. All sections used 7-
point bi-polar scales. Each section was averaged by totaling the responses and dividing 
by the number of items. Attitudes toward blood donation consisted of a 5-item measure 
with the instructions “Please rate how you feel about donating blood this week on the 
following dimensions”. The dimensions included Unpleasant/Pleasant, 
Unsatisfying/Satisfying, Bad/Good, Harmful/Beneficial, and Repulsive/Attractive. 
Subjective Norms was evaluated with 6 questions. In the first question, participants rated 
agreement with the statement, “Most people who are important to me think I should give 
blood this week”.  Participants then rated the likelihood that various members of their 
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social group (friends, family, peers, etc.) would think that “you should donate blood next 
week”. Self-efficacy beliefs were rated with four-items, “How confident are you that you 
will be able to give blood this week?”, “If it were entirely up to me, I am confident that I 
would be able to give blood this week”, “I believe I have the ability to give blood this 
week”, and “To what extent do you see yourself as capable of giving blood this week”. 
Perceived Behavioral Control was also measured with four-items, “My giving blood this 
week is likely to be influenced by factors beyond my control”, “How much personal 
control do you feel you have over giving blood this week”, “It is mostly up to me whether 
or not I give blood this week”, and “How much do you feel that giving blood this week is 
beyond your control?”. Identity as a blood donor was assessed with three items, “To give 
blood is an important part of who I am”, “I would describe myself as an advocate for 
blood donation”, “Giving blood is important to maintain a good self-image of myself”. 
Donation intention was measured with 3 items, “I intend to give blood this week”, I will 
try to give blood this week”, and “I have decided to give blood this week”. Control 
behaviors were evaluated by responding to how likely 9 possible donation events (e.g. “a 
previous experience”, “fear of needles”) would influence their giving of blood next week. 
After the TPB measures, participants rated their affect (21-point negative/positive 
scale) toward the pictures in the scenario, and lastly completed a demographic 
questionnaire. Five days later, participants were contacted with an invitation to the 
second survey and were given three days to respond. Three-hundred and twenty-eight 
completed the second survey (14.5% attrition) and were retained for further analysis. A 
comparison between the drop out participants and those that completed both waves did 
not reveal any significant difference in overall affect toward blood donation at time 1 
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(drop-outs M=3.99, SD = 5.34; completed both M = 3.61, SD = 5.59), age (drop-outs M 
= 31.82, SD = 10.99; completed both M = 33.00, SD =12.48), or other demographic 
variables. The second survey first asked participants about their behaviors related to 
blood donation since the first survey. They selected one of the following options, “I did 
not think about nor did I make an attempt to donate blood or plasma”, “I thought about 
donating blood or plasma but did not attempt any behaviors toward completing the 
donation”, “I completed steps toward donating blood or plasma (looking up blood center, 
got more information, talk to others, etc.) but did not attempt to complete donation. 
(Describe behavior)”, “I donated blood or plasma since the last survey or am scheduled to 
do so in the near future”, and “I attempted to donate since the last survey but did not 
complete donation (state reason)”. Then participants completed the overall affect rating 
the TPB measure once again, with the text frames altered to donating blood “in the 
future” instead of “next week”.  
Results 
Descriptive and Preliminary Analyses. Table 7 displays the means and standard 
deviations of the outcome and TPB variables, split by condition and totaled. The grey 
rows can be used to compare the appeal conditions (single child or single child with 
pseudoinefficacy information) with each other and the grand mean. Intervention 
conditions can be compared with each other and the grand mean in the last 4 rows of the 
table. There were some notable and unexpected differences among the variables between 
conditions and across the two waves. Outcome variables differed little by appeal 
condition. 
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Table 7. Study 2 Mean Warm Glow and TPB measures by Condition 
   Warm Glow Attitude Norms Self-efficacy PCB Identity 
Donation 
Intention 
Condition  T1 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
Single 
child 
SI 66.07 
(27.13) 
3.93 
(1.33) 
4.67 
(1.33) 
3.3 
(1.63) 
3.68 
(1.44) 
3.67 
(1.46) 
4.55 
(1.32) 
5.08 
(1.72) 
5.04 
(1.46) 
3.1 
(1.45) 
3.1 
(1.51) 
2.08 
(1.56) 
4.28 
(1.87) 
D 70.88 
(23.58) 
3.87 
(1.24) 
4.84 
(1.07) 
3.27 
(1.49) 
3.99 
(1.53) 
3.25 
(1.29) 
4.27 
(1.37) 
4.67 
(1.75) 
5.14 
(1.36) 
3.17 
(1.42) 
2.92 
(1.54) 
2.29 
(1.37) 
3.99 
(1.96) 
C 65.81 
(23.71) 
3.82 
(1.38) 
4.77 
(1.34) 
3.67 
(1.46) 
4.12 
(1.56) 
3.42 
(1.33) 
4.55 
(1.37) 
4.71 
(1.7) 
4.93 
(1.39) 
3.49 
(1.5) 
3.43 
(1.37) 
2.77 
(1.84) 
4.73 
(1.84) 
Total 67.38 
(24.86) 
3.87 
(1.31) 
4.75 
(1.26) 
3.42 
(1.53) 
3.93 
(1.52) 
3.46 
(1.37) 
4.47 
(1.35) 
4.83 
(1.72) 
5.03 
(1.4) 
3.26 
(1.46) 
3.17 
(1.48) 
2.39 
(1.63) 
4.36 
(1.9) 
Single + 
Pseudo-
inefficacy  
SI 71.72 
(21.2) 
4.01 
(1.29) 
5.13 
(1.12) 
3.91 
(1.38) 
4.23 
(1.22) 
3.84 
(1.31) 
4.28 
(1.14) 
4.59 
(1.68) 
4.56 
(1.38) 
3.44 
(1.25) 
3.59 
(1.3) 
3.02 
(1.51) 
4.8 
(1.65) 
D 60.77 
(27.67) 
3.66 
(1.39) 
4.39 
(1.57) 
3.64 
(1.66) 
4.03 
(1.53) 
3.55 
(1.49) 
4.18 
(1.61) 
4.74 
(1.67) 
5.1 
(1.46) 
3.05 
(1.58) 
3.14 
(1.46) 
2.21 
(1.57) 
4.14 
(2.09) 
C 64.98 
(22.23) 
3.95 
(1.32) 
4.68 
(1.45) 
3.69 
(1.8) 
4.3 
(1.5) 
3.29 
(1.54) 
4.46 
(1.25) 
4.41 
(1.86) 
4.85 
(1.5) 
3.18 
(1.52) 
3.46 
(1.67) 
2.31 
(1.66) 
4.38 
(1.8) 
Total 65.06 
(24.69) 
3.84 
(1.34) 
4.68 
(1.44) 
3.73 
(1.63) 
4.16 
(1.44) 
3.55 
(1.47) 
4.29 
(1.38) 
4.6 
(1.73) 
4.88 
(1.46) 
3.2 
(1.48) 
3.36 
(1.49) 
2.46 
(1.61) 
4.39 
(1.9) 
Total SI 68.45 
(24.85) 
3.96 
(1.3) 
4.86 
(1.26) 
3.56 
(1.55) 
3.91 
(1.37) 
3.75 
(1.4) 
4.43 
(1.25) 
4.88 
(1.71) 
4.84 
(1.44) 
3.24 
(1.37) 
3.3 
(1.44) 
2.48 
(1.6) 
4.5 
(1.79) 
D 65.13 
(26.36) 
3.75 
(1.33) 
4.58 
(1.39) 
3.48 
(1.59) 
4.01 
(1.52) 
3.42 
(1.41) 
4.22 
(1.5) 
4.71 
(1.7) 
5.12 
(1.41) 
3.1 
(1.5) 
3.05 
(1.49) 
2.25 
(1.48) 
4.08 
(2.03) 
C 65.45 
(22.98) 
3.87 
(1.35) 
4.73 
(1.38) 
3.68 
(1.61) 
4.2 
(1.53) 
3.36 
(1.42) 
4.51 
(1.31) 
4.58 
(1.77) 
4.9 
(1.43) 
3.35 
(1.51) 
3.44 
(1.5) 
2.57 
(1.77) 
4.58 
(1.82) 
Total 66.27 
(24.77) 
3.86 
(1.33) 
4.72 
(1.35) 
3.57 
(1.58) 
4.04 
(1.48) 
3.5 
(1.41) 
4.38 
(1.37) 
4.72 
(1.73) 
4.96 
(1.43) 
3.23 
(1.47) 
3.26 
(1.48) 
2.43 
(1.62) 
4.38 
(1.89) 
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Collapsing across the pseudoinefficacy manipulation, the structured introspection 
condition resulted in slightly greater warm glow (M=68.45, SD=24.36), attitude toward 
donating blood (M=3.96, SD=1.3), and self-efficacy (M=3.75, SD=1.40), compared to 
the other two conditions. For donation intentions, the structured introspection condition 
with pseudoinefficacy showed the highest mean (M=3.02), SD=1.51). This result is 
explored later in the inference tests. 
Table 8. Blood donation behavior at time 2  
Condition 
No action or 
thought 
Thought 
about BD 
Completed steps 
toward BD 
Attempted or 
Completed BD n 
Single 
child 
  
  
  
SI 64.4% 23.7% 5.1% 6.8% 59 
D 50.0% 42.0% 4.0% 4.0% 50 
C 48.4% 37.1% 4.8% 9.7% 62 
Total 54.4% 33.9% 4.7% 7.0% 171 
Single + 
Pseudo 
  
  
  
SI 51.2% 30.2% 11.6% 7.0% 43 
D 57.6% 34.8% 4.5% 3.0% 66 
C 50.0% 39.6% 2.1% 8.3% 48 
Total 53.5% 35.0% 5.7% 5.7% 157 
Total 
  
  
  
SI 58.8% 26.5% 7.8% 6.9% 102 
D 54.3% 37.9% 4.3% 3.4% 116 
C 49.1% 38.2% 3.6% 9.1% 110 
Total 54.0% 34.5% 5.2% 6.4% 328 
 
Table 8 displays the percent of participants who participated in the range of blood 
donation behaviors. Blood donation attempts and completed blood donations were 
collapsed into a single category. Percent for rows are split between the experimental 
conditions. The rate of attempted or completed donation rates was low (6.4% across all 
conditions).
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A little over half (54%) of the participants reported no action or thought beyond the first 
survey, while about a third (34.5%) participated in some additional thought about blood 
donation. 
The remaining amount (5.2%) completed some steps toward completing a 
donation, such as researching a donation center. Interestingly, the structured introspection 
with pseudoinefficacy information showed a small boost in this category (11.6%) 
compared to the deliberation (4.5%) and control (2.1%) conditions, although this 
difference was not statistically significant χ2 (6) = 6.33, p=.387. 
Table 9 contains the Pearson correlations between the outcome variables and TPB 
measures for each time point. The single item overall affect ratings toward donating were 
highly correlated between time points (r=.82, p<.001), and with the attitudes measure 
(r=.64, p<.001). Thus the attitudes measure was used in further analysis as a measure 
containing affective responses, in order to maintain coherence to the TPB model. The 
range of donation behaviors were strongly correlated with intentions to donate at time 1 
(r=.56, p<.001) and time 2 (r=.45, p<.001).  Anticipated warm glow from donating was 
moderately correlated with self-efficacy at time 1 (r=.21, p<.001) and donation intentions 
(r=.29, p<.001) but had a smaller correlation with donation behaviors, r=.18, p=.001. 
Figure 6 shows the mean self-ratings for factors in blood donation influencing 
their decision to donate. An efficient operation was the highest rated factor (M = 4.45, SD 
= 2.16), indicating worries about complications during the donation process or time 
concerns prevent many from attempting donation.  
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Table 9. Correlation Matrix with Outcome Variables and TPB measures.  
Variable   1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
Overall 
affect 
1. T1 -               
2. T2 .82** -              
Warm 
glow 3. T1 .40** .43** -             
Attitude 4. T1 .64** .60** .41** 0.84 
           
5. T2 .72** .81** .43** .67** 0.87           
Norms 6. T1 .24** .33** .35** .38** .41** 0.92 
         
7. T2 .29** .38** .33** .40** .40** .67** 0.90         
Self-
efficacy 
8. T1 .33** .33** .21** .35** .35** .26** .20** 0.63        
9. T2 .40** .48** .23** .35** .43** .20** .21** .44** 0.66       
PCB 10. T1 -0.16 -0.14 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 0.00 -0.10 .19** .11* 0.88 
     
11. T2 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 .12* .17** .52** 0.86     
Identity 12. T1 .44** .49** .38** .48** .47** .48** .47** .26** .24** -0.09 -0.06 0.75 
   
13. T2 .42** .52** .29** .40** .51** .47** .55** .28** .28** -0.10 -0.09 .76** 0.79   
Donation 
intention 
14. T1 .40** .47** .29** .45** .49** .46** .38** .41** .24** 0.05 -0.02 .60** .55** 0.94  
15. T2 .65** .74** .38** .56** .66** .44** .53** .34** .50** -0.09 -0.02 .54** .65** .55** 0.96 
Donation 
behavior 16. T2 .35** .41** .18** .29** .36** .24** .22** .24** .21** -0.10 -0.08 .36** .41** .56** .45** 
 
Note.  Cronbach’s Alpha on the diagonal in italics for TPB measures; *=p≤.05, **=p≤.01
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Figure 6. Mean self-rating of influence of control behaviors 
 
Hypothesis tests. Hypotheses tests were completed using stepwise multiple linear 
regression with planned orthogonal contrasts codes. Step 1 included the covariates Age, 
Gender (binary coded: 1=male, 2=female), and Education). Step 2 entered the contrast 
codes. Coefficients for the planned contrasts are presented in Table 10 for each of 
dependent variables (Warm glow, Self-efficacy, Attitude, and donation intentions). The 
difference scores for the TPB measures were calculated by subtracting time 2 from time 
1. These scores were regressed on the covariates and contrast codes.  
Hypothesis 1, predicting a main effect of pseudoinefficacy, was not supported.  
Warm glow (, Self-efficacy, Attitude, and donation intentions showed no significant 
differences between the control (single child appeal) and experimental condition (appeal 
with pseudoinefficacy stimuli). Hypothesis 2a, predicting a main effect of SI, was 
partially supported. The structured introspection condition showed no significant 
difference in mean warm glow, attitude, or donation intentions compared to deliberation 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Previous Experience
Fear of Needles
Fear of fainting
Fear of being sick
Fear of catching some infection
Fear of discovering illness
Losing time from study or work
A payment of incentive
Efficient operation
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or control. A significant difference in Self-efficacy was observed comparing the SI to 
control condition such that the SI condition resulted in significantly higher ratings of self-
efficacy at time 1 (β = .11, p = .05) than the control condition. This difference was also 
statistically significant comparing the SI condition to the other two conditions combined 
(β = .12, p = .03). Hypothesis 2b predicted an interaction between the intervention and 
pseudoinefficacy manipulations. The intervention manipulation did interact with the 
pseudoinefficacy manipulation but not in the predicted manner (See Figure 7).  
The effect of the structured introspection was moderated by the presence or 
absence of the pseudoinefficacy stimuli (contrast 6) for only donation intentions: when 
viewing the appeal child appeal alone and then completing the introspection task (with no 
pseudoinefficacy information), participants reported significantly less intention to donate 
(β = 0.10, p = .02) than control. Conversely, including the pseudoinefficacy stimuli 
resulted in intentions to donate slightly above those reported in the control.  Hypothesis 3 
tested the effect of deliberation and was not supported. The control and deliberation 
conditions did not significantly differ between warm glow, donation amount, rate of 
donation, or decision satisfaction (contrast 7). 
Consequentially, exploratory Hypothesis 3b was not supported. There was no 
evidence that the deliberation condition differed from the other two conditions or that this 
effect interacted with the pseudoinefficacy manipulation.  Lastly, there was no main 
effect found for the outcome variables comparing thinking conditions (SI and D) to 
control (contrast 4).
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Table 10. Contrast coefficients (SD) for Outcome Variables in Study 2 
 Warm Glow Self-efficacy Attitude Donation Intention  Contrast  T1 Δ T1 Δ T1 Δ 
1. Single child vs  
w/ 
Pseudoinefficacy 
0.02 (1.39) -0.04 (0.08) 0.03 (0.11) -0.01 (0.08) -0.01 (0.07) -0.05 (0.09) 0.01 (0.10) 
2. SI vs D 0.06 (1.70) 0.10 (0.10) -0.07 (0.14) 0.70 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.07 (0.16) 0.04 (0.12) 
3. SI vs Control 0.07 (1.74) 0.11 (0.10)* -0.02 (0.14) -0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.11) 0.00 (0.12) 
4. SI & D vs 
Control -0.02 (0.97) -0.08 (0.06) -0.02 (0.08) 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06) 0.02 (0.07) 
5. SI vs Others 0.07 (1.00) 0.12 (0.06)* -0.05 (0.08) 0.06 (0.05) -0.00 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07) 
6. SIc vs SIp 0.07 (2.52) 0.02 (0.14) 0.04 (0.20) 0.01 (0.14) 0.06 (0.13) 0.16 (0.17)** -0.07 (0.17) 
7. D vs Control -0.02 (1.7) -0.01 (0.09) -0.06 (0.13) 0.04 (0.09) 0.02 (0.09) 0.07 (.011) 0.04 (0.12) 
8. SIp VS Others 0.10 (0.68) 0.08 (0.04) -0.00 (0.06) 0.04 (0.04) 0.04 (0.04) 0.14 (0.04)** -0.04 (0.05) 
Note. SI= Structured Introspection, D=Deliberation, SIp=Structured Introspection (Pseudoinefficacy condition), SIc=Structured 
Introspection (control condition); Δ= difference score T2-T1;*=p≤.05, **=p≤.01. 
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Figure 7. Mean warm glow, self-efficacy, attitude, and donation intention by condition  
 
Exploratory analysis. Data were analyzed using path analysis in Mplus version 6.12. The 
model was specified according to the Theory of Planned Behavior: donation behavior is 
predicted solely by donation intentions. Intentions are driven by 4 factors: Attitude 
toward blood donation, perceived Self-efficacy, perceived Norms, and Identity. These 
exogenous variables were allowed to covary with one another within the model.  Skew in 
the donation and intent behaviors toward no action and low intent resulted in concerns 
about about non-normality. Thus, the model was fit with maximum likelihood parameter 
estimates with standard errors and Satorra-Bentler chi-square (MLM) with robustness 
against non-normality. The overall model produced good a fit χ2(4)  = 1.95, p=.74, TLI 
=1.02, SRMR = .01. The model explained 46% of the variance (R2) in donation behaviors 
while explaining 32% of the variance in donation intentions. The model was then split by 
the introspection manipulation (see Figure 8), χ2(14)  = 5.90, p=.97, TLI =1.05, SRMR = 
.02.  Splitting by this condition variable revealed marked differences in the paths from 
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Figure 8. TPB path analysis by introspection condition 
 
Note: Top coefficient = Structure Introspection, middle = deliberation, bottom = Control. *=p≤.05, **=p≤.01, ***=p≤.001
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Self-efficacy to Donation intentions and the covariance from Attitude with Self-efficacy. 
Constraining these paths to be equal across conditions produce significantly poorer fit, 
indicating a significant difference between the conditions, Satorra-Bentler Scaled Chi-
square χ2(5)  = 15.10, p=.01. More specifically, the SI condition had a significantly 
stronger path between Self-efficacy and intentions (β = .31, p < .001) compared to the 
Deliberation condition (β = .12, p = .08) or Control (β = .14, p = .04). The covariance 
from Attitudes and Self-efficacy was stronger in the Deliberation condition (β = .49, p < 
.001) compared to the SI (β = .28, p = .01) or the Control (β = .27, p = .04).   
Discussion 
Study 2 sought to explore identical psychological phenomenon as study 1 but 
within an understudied context of prosocial behavior: blood donation.  The 
pseudoinefficacy manipulation that visually displayed a negative aspect of blood 
donation (the procedure itself) and highlighted the need for blood donations did not 
produce a main effect across multiple outcome variables. Additionally an introspection 
task was again used as an intervention to mitigate experiences of negative affect in a 
prosocial decision context.  This manipulation produced a significant boost in self-
efficacy for blood donation in the structured introspection, compared to the deliberation 
or control conditions. Results from a path analysis revealed that the structured 
introspection strengthened the relationship between self-efficacy and donation intentions, 
indirectly affecting donation behaviors. Conversely, deliberation caused a stronger path 
between attitudes and self-efficacy, while in the control condition Norms and Identity 
were the strongest predictors of donation intention. This suggests than an unguided 
thought process may cause people to dwell on their emotions, which can decrease 
90 
efficacy when valence of the emotion is negative.The structured introspection, meanwhile 
is thought to have encouraged a meta-analytic perspective by forcing people to evaluate 
the factors of a decision space, providing a boost in self-efficacy. While both versions of 
the introspection condition saw a boost in self-efficacy, the condition with the 
pseudoinefficacy information included saw a greater increase in donation intentions, even 
compared to all other conditions. Introspecting about the larger need and those at risk (in 
tandem with personal feelings and the benefits to recipient), caused the greatest benefit to 
donation intentions.  These findings also lend support to the Theory of Planned Behavior 
in blood donations.  
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary of Studies. The studies in this dissertation were designed to examine the 
phenomenon of pseudoinefficacy and to test a novel introspection intervention as a 
method of de-biasing pseudoinefficacy. Results from two studies failed to replicate the 
pseudoinefficacy phenomenon by adding stimuli about those one cannot help. In study 1 
the pseudoinefficacy information did not lead to decreased anticipated warm glow, 
donation amount, or the decision to donate or not. In study 2, the manipulation did not 
directly influence anticipated warm glow, attitudes toward blood donation, intentions to 
donate or actual blood donation behavior.  
The cause of the failed manipulation is unclear. In study 1, one could argue that 
the video appeal overshadowed the pseudoinefficacy condition in terms of induced 
negative affect. The ratings of the video and pseudoinefficacy stimuli revealed that 
people rated the video as significantly more negative than the pseudoinefficacy stimuli. If 
the emotion responses to these stimuli are averaged (see Västfjäll, et al., 2016) then 
including the less negative stimuli of the pseudoinefficacy condition might actually make 
the affective evaluation of the overall scenario to be more positive. However, this was not 
the case in study 2, in which the single child condition contained only a positive stimulus 
of a happy girl who was helped from blood donation. This mix of stimuli also did not 
produce a main effect of decreased warm glow or donation intentions.   
The results of the intervention were mixed. In study 1, the introspection condition 
did not influence warm glow or directly influence prosocial behaviors compared to 
deliberation or control.  The interaction of the pseudoinefficacy with the intervention 
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revealed that decision satisfaction and donation amount was lower when participants 
introspected about the scenario—only considering the two factors of the context and the 
need—than when the pseudoinefficacy information was included and rated it in the 
introspection task.  This curious finding was best explained by an interaction with 
psychological distancing, such that participants in the appeal-only SI condition distanced 
themselves from the scenario and donated less money.  However, this interaction did not 
explain the difference in decision satisfaction observed. A reading of the open-ended 
questions about what participants were thinking during the task revealed that participants 
in the appeal-only SI condition tended to report “skepticism toward the charity” and 
mentioned notions of feeling “slightly manipulated”. Reports of these thoughts were less 
prevalent in the pseudoinefficacy variant of the SI condition.  Introspective tasks could be 
viewed as manipulative for a few reasons.  The task itself may have been viewed as a 
ploy to influence behavior toward donating employed by the charity. People who are 
more emotionally sensitive may have distanced themselves from the scenario as a 
protective measure, rather than reengaging with the scenario content. The two-item 
introspection task in the appeal-only condition may have been perceived as too limited, 
rating only the context and benefit to the victim. 
Study 1 failed to also pin down a clear moderator of differing motivational 
reactions to pseudoinefficacy stimuli. The DERS and REI Experiential subscales (Ability 
and Engagement) appear to relate to both how much influence this information has over 
people, as well as the direction of the influence (demotivated or motivated more). 
However, neither of these subscales on their own moderated the pseudoinefficacy 
manipulation. The novel ERT measure was also predictive of these motivational 
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questions and giving overall but, again, this measure did not moderate the 
pseudoinefficacy manipulation. The ERT measure provides the most interesting results in 
that the task itself is completely unrelated to prosocial behaviors.  These results suggest 
that these individual difference measures are tapping into a shared psychological 
phenomenon related to the tendency to use affect as information in decision of the 
emotion. However, the failed replication of the pseudoinefficacy effect does not allow 
significant variance in the conditions to be explained.  
  Introspection in study 2 demonstrated promise for increasing intentions to donate 
blood.  The structured introspection lead to a small main effect of increased perceived 
self-efficacy of blood donation over the deliberation and control conditions.   A path 
analysis using the TPB model revealed that this boost to self-efficacy provided indirect 
effects to increased blood donation through the relationship of self-efficacy to donation 
intentions.  Additionally, deliberation seemed to increase the relationship between blood 
donation attitudes and perceived self-efficacy, suggesting that deliberating participants 
may be focusing on the personal attitudes, strengthening the relationship between how 
one feels toward blood donation in the moment with rating of self-efficacy to complete 
the donation. In comparison, the control condition supported the multi-facet TPB model 
for intentions such that attitudes, self-efficacy, norms, and identity all individually predict 
donation intentions. Identity was the strongest predictor of donation intentions in the 
control condition. Thus introspection may draw attention away from identity concerns, 
norms, and attitudes and toward ability in evaluating the prospective of donating blood.  
An interaction between the introspection condition and pseudoinefficacy 
condition was also found, supporting stated hypotheses. The results suggest that 
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introspection increased perceived self-efficacy over deliberation and control but only in 
the pseudoinefficacy introspection condition did this increase in efficacy translate to 
increased intentions. This finding compliments the study 1 finding such that the number 
and type factors provided in the structured introspection is crucial to thought process 
around the decision context. Rating the importance of the greater need, beyond our help, 
may provide a sense of urgency to the decision, suppressing impressions of personal 
costs.  
Limitations. Research conducted online has some inherent limitations.  The 
majority of measures used in both studies rely on self-report.  Self-reported tendencies 
are subjective to personal biases and abilities to reflect accurate on one’s own thinking 
patterns.  This can provide misleading values in measures of thinking style such that it 
allows false beliefs to remain undetected.    Online research also sacrifices a controlled 
lab experience. Differences in participation environments can increase unexplained error.  
Survey environment may attract particular types of participants who are more 
technologically savvy or who find electronic tasks more stimulating. Thus the results of 
online research may not reflect the population as whole, or in contexts where prosocial 
behaviors are exhibited in the presence of others. 
Limitations in the format for measuring prosocial behavior were also present in this 
research. In study 1, the donation was semi-hypothetical such that it was not the 
participant’s own money but an anticipated chance of an extra sum. Real donations with 
personal funds may be influenced by different factors than hypothetical donations. While 
study 2 did allow time for blood donation behaviors to occur, many people in the study 
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noted timing issues, transportation concerns, or availability of donation locations. Thus, 
one week may not accurately capture a long-term effect of the intervention(s). 
Future directions. Future research needs to be done to explore if and when the 
pseudoinefficacy effect can replicated in prosocial behavior.  It does not appear to be 
sufficient to only present information about the greater need or children who cannot 
receive aid. More research is needed to determine if pseudoinefficacy only occurs with 
particular framing (e.g. only with identified targets) or in certain populations (e.g. young 
students). Another possibility is that the stimuli must produce a feeling of utter 
hopelessness in order to demotivate action. Additional research is also needed to 
determine differential reactions to pseudoinefficacy stimuli.  A future study could 
systematically explore how the individual difference measures used here (ERT, DERS 
and REI) moderate basic emotional reaction to generic stimuli. Understanding how 
emotion is integrated in the mind may provide the key to understanding when 
pseudoinefficacy or “drop in the bucket” thinking occurs and when it motivates or 
demotivates prosocial action. 
Blood donation remains an understudied area. The results here suggested that 
warm glow was only weakly correlated with donation intentions. Research has found that 
warm glow is more predictive of continued donations rather than single behaviors, 
suggesting that warm glow is learned experience (Ferguson et al., 2012a & 2012b). Thus 
a multi-wave longitudinal design may better explain how warm glow is affected over 
time, such that people may become more sensitive to contextual information of the 
victims as their ability to anticipate warm glow develops.  
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Future research for introspection is needed to understand the critical elements 
from the task. Evidence from this research suggested that the number and type of factors 
that participants introspect about is important. A more systematic variation of 
introspective tasks could elucidate when the task is perceived as manipulative versus 
enlightening to participants. We know from the previous research that simply including 
more factors is not beneficial but future studies will need to determine a sweet spot of 
effort and introspective value.  
Practical Implications. This research has several implications for applied 
contexts, such as donation solicitation for charities, and, more broadly, conveying 
information to the public regarding global issues. Charitable organizations must decide 
how best to communicate with potential new donors and maintain relationships with 
regular donors. The research presented in this dissertation suggests that people may be 
more directly influenced by other factors in the scenario, such as personal connection to 
the cause or specific context of the need rather than by emotional reaction to pictures and 
videos in the case of solicitation. In other words, the motivational forces within an 
unexpected donation solicitation (as in the case of the studies presented here) may differ 
from contexts of unprompted, self-generated, or spontaneous prosocial behavior. 
Solicitations for donations or charitable may be so wide-spread that emotional content 
within them may have lost its “shock value” to potential donors.  Cameron and Payne 
(2011) argue that the expectation of giving money causes some to preemptively regulate 
emotions as a psychological protection measure. We know that emotional images can 
affect prosocial motivations. However, it is possible that humans are more susceptible to 
biases resulting from emotional content when the context of the need is not within an 
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expectation to donate. A study of donations to the Swedish Red Cross found that an 
iconic image from the Syrian war led to a massive and unanticipated boost to donations 
after going viral on social media, but this effect faded quickly (Slovic, Västfjäll, 
Erlandsson, & Gregory, 2017). NGO’s and charitable efforts will struggle to compete for 
attention in markets saturated with emotional appeals, an effect that may become more 
pronounced as a humans are becoming more connected in the digital age.  
Electronic devices are becoming ubiquitous sources of information and 
interconnectivity across the world. Newzoo (2018) reports that the number of smartphone 
users is expected to exceed 3.8 billion by the year 2020. These devices provide huge 
shifts in communication and connectivity between humans, but may have important side 
effects. No other time in human history have we been more aware of the suffering of 
others. One could spend one’s entire existence attempting to stay informed with the litany 
of crises, neediness, and terrible tragedies occurring in the world. The onslaught of the 
“ever-present need” may drive humans to become increasingly numb to media depicting 
suffering or tragedy, as to engage with every negative image would be neither helpful nor 
psychologically healthy.  
The open-ended response results from study 1 implied that many suspected they 
were being manipulated by their emotions. Appeals to prosocial behavior may benefit 
from a shift effort away from emotional appeals toward other perceived benefits of the 
behavior, such as social connectedness or economic sustainability. On the other hand, 
consumers of electronic information will need to consider whether the side-effects from 
being continually immersed in the internet are worth the more easily evaluable benefits.  
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The broader implications of the introspection intervention are less clear and future 
research will need to uncover the context in which it will beneficial to decision making. 
The results from Study 2 imply that reflecting on how factors in a decision space might 
influence us may increase our sense of our abilities to accomplish challenging tasks. As 
the scale of global crises will only increase over time due to population growth and 
climate change, the need to feel that our actions are worthwhile will become more 
critical. Instructing people to introspect on the motivational influences in their lives is one 
way to increase the evaluability of our choices and behaviors. However, introspection 
may also have a detrimental effect on prosocial efforts if the framing of the reflection 
task is too narrow (i.e. only 2 factors considered) or the personal value of the outcome is 
already low. Thus, introspection may make our personal values more evaluable in 
contrast to object information, but the usefulness of that evaluation may rely on the 
implications of those personal values.   
Conclusions. In the current age, disasters and humanitarian crises are widely 
covered by media, documented, and discussed endlessly through the internet. We are 
awash with this information, yet our responses to the needy remain suboptimal in 
comparison to our stated values of human life, animal life, and ecological life. The 
research in value-of-life and prosocial behavior seeks to explain and de-bias this gap. 
Mixed findings paint a picture of interconnected and competing psychological forces that 
sway prosocial motivation. The various contexts and circumstances of helping behaviors 
complicate matters further. As the population grows, humans will continue to struggle to 
grasp the scale of victims in need.  
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 This dissertation sought to improve decision making in a prosocial behavior 
context with a simple framing intervention. While success of the intervention was 
limited, introspection remains a tool of interest in de-biasing scope neglect and the role of 
negative affect in environments where prosocial behavior is involved. The evidence 
suggests that by turning inward to scrutinize the degree to which decision factors should 
influence us, we may increase our perception of self-efficacy. Maintaining a sense of 
efficacy while being continuously reminded of global crises will be a challenge for the 
future of humankind. Save the Children’s director recently announced that up to 85,000 
children under the age of 5 have starved to death in Yemen since 2015, with 14 million 
more still in dire risk (Karasz, 2018). Climate change looms over human society, with 
over 1 million species on the verge of extinction (Resnick, 2019). Small changes in 
motivation and prosocial behaviors can have large impacts when aggregated. Most 
importantly, even single instances of giving can make a world of a difference to a 
suffering child or endangered animal.
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APPENDIX A 
MATERIALS FOR STUDY 1 
  
Start of Block: Background and Intro 
 
On the next few pages, we will ask you to evaluate a charitable appeal regarding the 
famine crisis in Yemen. Yemen is a country in the Middle East affected by war and 
conflict. This conflict has made civilians, especially children, at risk of violence and now 
starvation and malnutrition.  
  
  
  
 The appeal on the next page in the form on a video with text. Please watch the 
entire video (duration: 20 seconds) read the information carefully 
End of Block: Background and Intro 
Start of Block: Single Child Condition 
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As the war in Yemen enters its fourth year – children in Yemen are facing a massive 
crisis. The volatile civil war, taking place in the midst of growing poverty, is causing the 
world’s worst humanitarian emergency. More than 11 million children urgently need 
lifesaving assistance. Countless more children are at risk of starvation as Yemen edges 
toward the brink of famine. Please view the charitable appeal video below (20 seconds 
long). Once finished, please advance to the next screen.     
 
  
 
End of Block: Single Child  
Start of Block: Pseudo 
 
As the war in Yemen enters its fourth year – children in Yemen are facing a massive 
crisis. The volatile civil war, taking place in the midst of growing poverty, is causing the 
world’s worst humanitarian emergency. More than 11 million children urgently need 
lifesaving assistance. Please view the charitable video below (20 seconds long) that 
requests aid for children like Baby Nusair, then read the information below.   
 
 
 
Countless more children are at risk of starvation as Yemen edges toward the brink of 
famine. Some children, like those shown in the picture below, are forced to flee due to 
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violence and are often not able to receive aid.    
  
 
 
End of Block: Pseudo  
Start of Block: Structured Introspection 
 
 
On the following page, we will ask you to consider a helping behavior for the charity in 
the appeal (Save the Children). First we would like you to think more deeply about the 
factors in the previous scenario that might influence your decision to help the charity. 
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Please rate how much the following factors should influence your feelings toward helping 
children in Yemen: 
 Not at all (1) Slightly (2) 
Moderately 
(3) 
Significantly 
(4) 
Extremely 
(5) 
The 
information 
of the many 
children who 
are unable to 
receive aid 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
The 
contextual 
information 
about the 
war and 
famine in 
Yemen (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
The need of 
the children 
currently at 
risk, like 
baby Nusair 
(2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
 
 
End of Block: Structured  
Start of Block: Deliberation 
 
On the following page, we will ask you to consider a helping behavior. First we would 
like you to think more deeply about the factors in the previous scenario that might 
influence your feelings toward helping the charity. Please spend 30 seconds thinking 
more deeply about factors in the scenario that might influence your feelings toward 
helping the children in Yemen, if given the opportunity to do so. The page will 
automatically advance in 30 seconds.  
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End of Block: Deliberation  
Start of Block: No added instruction 
 
Thank you. Please continue to the next page.  
 
End of Block: No added instruction  
Start of Block: Warm glow 
 
We will also ask you to think about “warm glow”, a positive feeling that you may 
experience when you do something good for someone. Take a moment to think about one 
situation from your own life when you experienced this feeling. 
  
 Now, imagine that you had the opportunity to donate money to a trusted aid organization 
to help children facing starvation and malnutrition, like baby Nusair in the video.   Please 
rate the strength of warm glow you would expect to feel if you were able to donate 
money to help the children by choosing a number between 0-100, using the options 
below: 
o 0-20 Low and no warm glow  (1)  
o 21-40  (2)  
o 41-60  (3)  
o 61-80  (4)  
o 81-100 High to extreme warm glow  (5)  
 
 
Page Break  
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Now we would like you to specify that feeling a little bit further. You chose [RESPONSE 
PROVIDED HERE]. Now, please pick a number within the category. For example, if 
you selected 21-40 then you would specify a number between 21 and 40 that best fits 
your feeling of warm glow.  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
End of Block: Warm glow  
Start of Block: Donation 
 
 
In addition to the payment specified by Prolific for participating in this study, you will 
also be entered in a drawing for a chance of winning an additional $100. 
 
We offer you the opportunity, should you receive the additional $100, to donate some of 
this money to Save the Children, in their effort to aid children in Yemen facing 
starvation, like baby Nusair in the video.  You can use the box below to choose the 
amount that you are willing to commit to giving, if you are selected to receive the 
$100.  Select 0 if you do not wish to donate anything, or 100 if you wish to donate all 
your winnings, or any number in between to indicate how much you wish to donate.  We 
will pay you the remaining part of the bonus and will donate the amount you chose to 
Save the Children. 
 
 
Amount of potential lottery winning I would like to donate, if won ($0-$100) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Donation  
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Start of Block: Feelings 
 
Now please answer the questions below regarding your feelings toward the video portion 
of charitable appeal. 
 
 
 
How much do you feel sad when thinking about baby Nusair? 
o Not at all sad  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very sad  (7)  
 
 
 
How much do you feel sad when thinking about the children who could not receive aid? 
o Not at all sad  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very sad  (7)  
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How much sympathy do you feel thinking about baby Nusair? 
o Not at all sympathetic  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very sympathetic  (7)  
 
 
 
How much did the opportunity of donating money make you feel better?  
o Not at all  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very much  (7)  
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How much guilt would you expect to feel if you chose to not donate any of your lottery 
winnings? 
o None at all  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very much  (7)  
 
 
 
How satisfied are you with your decision regarding the donation to Save the Children? 
o Not at all satisfied  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very much satisfied  (7)  
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How much guilt did you experience from deciding not to donate any of your lottery 
winnings? 
o None at all  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very much  (7)  
 
 
 
How much do you think your donation would help children like baby Nusair? 
o Not at all  (1)  
o    (2)  
o    (3)  
o    (4)  
o    (5)  
o    (6)  
o Very much  (7)  
 
End of Block: Feelings  
Start of Block: Experience with appeal 
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Please write a brief description (1-2 sentences) of your thoughts and feelings you 
experienced while viewing the charity appeal.  
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Page Break  
 
We interested in your reaction to the charitable appeal displayed earlier. Please answer 
the following questions. 
 
I experienced an emotional reaction to the appeal 
o Strongly disagree  (2)  
o Disagree  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  
o Strongly Agree  (1)  
 
 
Page Break  
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Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding the charity 
appeal: 
 Strongly disagree (4) Disagree (5) Agree (6) 
Strongly agree 
(7) 
I felt annoyed 
by being shown 
the information 
(13)  
o  o  o  o  
I purposefully 
ignored or 
looked away 
from the appeal 
(14)  
o  o  o  o  
The appeal 
made me feel 
angry (15)  o  o  o  o  
I distanced 
myself from the 
situation shown 
in the appeal 
(16)  
o  o  o  o  
I felt "moved" 
by the appeal 
(17)  o  o  o  o  
I felt that the 
appeal was 
"over the top" 
(18)  
o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Experience with appeal  
Start of Block: Pseudo Q's 
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Thinking back to the scenario, there was a picture and information about children who 
were unable to receive aid. How much do you think seeing the children who could not 
receive aid influenced your motivation toward helping the charity? 
o Did not influence my motivation at all  (1)  
o Influenced my motivation a little  (2)  
o Moderately influenced my motivation  (4)  
o Greatly influenced my motivation  (5)  
 
 
 
And, in what way did this information about the children who were unable to receive aid 
influence your motivation, if at all? 
o Strongly demotivated me from helping  (1)  
o Slightly demotivated me from helping  (2)  
o Slighted motivated me more to help  (4)  
o Strongly motivated me more to help  (5)  
o Other (please explain briefly)  (3) 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
In large-scale humanitarian crises, we are often reminded of victims that we are unable to 
help or problems we cannot entirely solve. Sometimes, this causes the perception that our 
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actions are like a "drop in the bucket". In general, how much do you think this "drop in 
the bucket" feeling influences your motivation toward helping others? 
o Did not influence my motivation at all  (1)  
o Influenced my motivation a little  (2)  
o Moderately influenced my motivation  (3)  
o Greatly influenced my motivation  (4)  
 
 
 
In what way does "drop in the bucket" thinking influence your motivation, if at all? 
o Strongly demotivates me from helping others  (1)  
o Slightly demotivates me from helping others  (2)  
o Slightly motivates me more to help others  (4)  
o Strongly motivates me more to help others  (5)  
o Other (please explain briefly)  (3) 
________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Pseudo Q's  
Start of Block: rate pics/vid 
 
How negative did you find the images shown earlier? Please rate below 
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Video of baby Nusair (no need to watch again):  
  
    
o Very Negative -10  (1)  
o -9  (2)  
o -8  (3)  
o -7  (4)  
o -6  (5)  
o -5  (6)  
o -4  (7)  
o -3  (8)  
o -2  (9)  
o -1  (22)  
o Neutral0  (23)  
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Picture of children that are unable to receive aid: 
 
o Very Negative -10  (1)  
o -9  (2)  
o -8  (3)  
o -7  (4)  
o -6  (5)  
o -5  (6)  
o -4  (7)  
o -3  (8)  
o -2  (9)  
o -1  (10)  
o Neutral0  (11)  
End of Block: rate pics/vid  
Start of Block: Intro to ID 
Thank you, now we will turn to some general questions about your tendencies in thinking 
& feeling.  
End of Block: Intro to ID 
Start of Block: DERS 
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Please indicate 
how often 
each of the 
following 
statements 
apply to you 
by selecting 
the ppropriate 
number from 
the scale 
below.    
1  
almost 
never 
(0-10%) (1) 
2 
sometimes 
(11-35%) (2) 
3 
about half 
the time 
(36%-65%) 
(3) 
4 
most of the 
time 
(66-90%) 
(4) 
5 
almost 
always 
(91-100%) 
(5) 
1) I am clear 
about my 
feelings. (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
 2) I pay 
attention to 
how I feel. (4)  o  o  o  o  o  
 3) I 
experience my 
emotions as 
overwhelming 
and out of 
control. (5)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 4) I have no 
idea how I am 
feeling. (6)  o  o  o  o  o  
 5) I have 
difficulty 
making sense 
out of my 
feelings. (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 6) I am 
attentive to my 
feelings. (8)  o  o  o  o  o  
 7) I know 
exactly how I 
am feeling. (9)  o  o  o  o  o  
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 8) I care 
about what I 
am feeling. 
(10)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 9) I am 
confused 
about how I 
feel. (11)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 10) When I’m 
upset, I 
acknowledge 
my emotions. 
(12)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 11) When I’m 
upset, I 
become angry 
with myself 
for feeling that 
way. (13)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 12) When I’m 
upset, I 
become 
embarrassed 
for feeling that 
way. (14)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 13) When I’m 
upset, I have 
difficulty 
getting work 
done. (15)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 14) When I’m 
upset, I 
become out of 
control. (16)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 15) When I’m 
upset, I 
believe that I 
will remain 
that way for a 
long time. (17)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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 16) When I’m 
upset, I 
believe that I 
will end up 
feeling very 
depressed. 
(18)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 17) When I’m 
upset, I 
believe that 
my feelings 
are valid and 
important. 
(19)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 18) When I’m 
upset, I have 
difficulty 
focusing on 
other things. 
(20)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 19) When I’m 
upset, I feel 
out of control. 
(21)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 20) When I’m 
upset, I can 
still get things 
done. (22)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 21) When I’m 
upset, I feel 
ashamed at 
myself for 
feeling that 
way. (23)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 22) When I’m 
upset, I know 
that I can find 
a way to 
eventually feel 
better. (24)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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 23) When I’m 
upset, I feel 
like I am 
weak. (25)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 24) When I’m 
upset, I feel 
like I can 
remain in 
control of my 
behaviors. 
(26)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 25) When I’m 
upset, I feel 
guilty for 
feeling that 
way. (27)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 26) When I’m 
upset, I have 
difficulty 
concentrating. 
(28)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 27) When I’m 
upset, I have 
difficulty 
controlling my 
behaviors. 
(29)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 28) When I’m 
upset, I 
believe there 
is nothing I 
can do to 
make myself 
feel better. 
(30)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 29) When I’m 
upset, I 
become 
irritated at 
myself for 
feeling that 
way. (31)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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 30) When I’m 
upset, I start to 
feel very bad 
about myself. 
(32)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 31) When I’m 
upset, I 
believe that 
wallowing in 
it is all I can 
do. (33)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 32) When I’m 
upset, I lose 
control over 
my behavior. 
(34)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 33) When I’m 
upset, I have 
difficulty 
thinking about 
anything else. 
(35)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 34) When I’m 
upset I take 
time to figure 
out what I’m 
really feeling. 
(36)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 35) When I’m 
upset, it takes 
me a long time 
to feel better. 
(37)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 36) When I’m 
upset, my 
emotions feel 
overwhelming. 
(38)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: DERS  
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Start of Block: REI 
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Please rate 
the following 
statements 
about your 
feelings, 
beliefs and 
behaviors 
using the 
scale 
below. Work 
rapidly 
Definitely 
false 
1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 
Definitely 
true 
5 (5) 
I like to rely 
on my 
intuitive 
impressions. 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Using my 
“gut 
feelings” 
usually 
works well 
for me in 
figuring out 
problems in 
my life (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I don’t have a 
very good 
sense of 
intuition. (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Intuition can 
be a very 
useful way to 
solve 
problems. (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I believe in 
trusting my 
hunches. (5)  o  o  o  o  o  
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I often go by 
my instincts 
when 
deciding on a 
course of 
action. (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I don’t think 
it is a good 
idea to rely 
on one’s 
intuition for 
important 
decisions. (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I don’t like 
situations in 
which I have 
to rely on 
intuition. (8)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I tend to use 
my heart as a 
guide for my 
actions. (9)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I trust my 
initial 
feelings 
about people. 
(10)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I think there 
are times 
when one 
should rely 
on one’s 
intuition. 
(11)  
o  o  o  o  o  
When it 
comes to 
trusting 
people, I can 
usually rely 
on my gut 
feelings. (12)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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If I were to 
rely on my 
gut feelings, I 
would often 
make 
mistakes. 
(13)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I generally 
don’t depend 
on my 
feelings to 
help me 
make 
decisions. 
(14)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I hardly ever 
go wrong 
when I listen 
to my 
deepest “gut 
feelings” to 
find an 
answer. (15)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I would not 
want to 
depend on 
anyone who 
described 
himself or 
herself as 
intuitive. (16)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I suspect my 
hunches are 
inaccurate as 
often as they 
are accurate 
(17)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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I can usually 
feel when a 
person is 
right or 
wrong, even 
if I can’t 
explain how I 
know. (18)  
o  o  o  o  o  
My snap 
judgments 
are probably 
not as good 
as most 
people’s. 
(19)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Please rate 
the following 
statements 
about your 
feelings, 
beliefs and 
behaviors 
using the 
scale 
below. Work 
rapidly. 
Definitely 
false 
1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 
Definitely 
true 
5 (5) 
I am not very 
good at 
solving 
problems that 
require 
careful 
logical 
analysis. (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I don’t like to 
have to do a 
lot of 
thinking. (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I enjoy 
solving 
problems that 
require hard 
thinking. (3)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I try to avoid 
situations 
that require 
thinking in 
depth about 
something. 
(4)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I have a 
logical mind. 
(5)  o  o  o  o  o  
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I’m not that 
good at 
figuring out 
complicated 
problems. (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I am much 
better at 
figuring 
things out 
logically than 
most people. 
(7)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I enjoy 
intellectual 
challenges. 
(8)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Reasoning 
things out 
carefully is 
not one of 
my strong 
points. (9)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I am not a 
very 
analytical 
thinker. (10)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I prefer 
complex to 
simple 
problems. 
(11)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Thinking 
hard and for 
a long time 
about 
something 
gives me 
little 
satisfaction. 
(12)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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I don’t 
reason well 
under 
pressure. (13)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I have no 
problem in 
thinking 
things 
through 
clearly. (14)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I enjoy 
thinking in 
abstract 
terms. (15)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Knowing the 
answer 
without 
having to 
understand 
the reasoning 
behind it is 
good enough 
for me. (16)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Thinking is 
not my idea 
of an 
enjoyable 
activity (17)  
o  o  o  o  o  
I usually 
have clear, 
explainable 
reasons for 
my decisions. 
(18)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Using logic 
usually 
works well 
for me in 
figuring out 
problems in 
my life. (19)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Learning 
new ways to 
think would 
be very 
appealing to 
me. (20)  
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: REI  
Start of Block: ERT_short 
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Below are a 
number of 
activities. 
We want 
you to rate 
each of the 
activities in 
terms of 
how you 
perceive 
their risks. 
Do not 
spend too 
much time 
on any one 
activity. 
Not at 
all risky 
1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Extremely 
risky 
7 (7) 
Taking 
ecstasy (4)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Taking 
cocain (5)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Smoking (6)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Shoplifting 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Cheating on 
a partner (8)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Driving a 
car (9)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Eating sugar 
(10)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Switching 
careers (11)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Taking 
painkillers 
(12)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Riding a 
rollercoaster 
(13)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Drinking tea 
(14)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Resting (15)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Reading 
(16)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Eating a 
salad (17)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Drinking 
Water (18)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Below are a 
number of 
activities. 
We want 
you to rate 
each of the 
activities in 
terms of 
how you 
perceive 
their 
benefits. 
Do not 
spend too 
much time 
on any one 
activity. 
Not at all 
beneficial 
1 (1) 
2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
Extremely 
beneficial 
7 (7) 
Taking 
ecstasy (4)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Taking 
cocaine (5)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Smoking (6)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Shoplifting 
(7)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Cheating on 
a partner (8)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Driving a 
car (9)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Eating sugar 
(10)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Switching 
careers (11)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Taking 
painkillers 
(12)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Riding a 
rollercoaster 
(13)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Drinking tea 
(14)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Resting (15)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Reading 
(16)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Eating a 
salad (17)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Drinking 
Water (18)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: ERT_short  
Start of Block: Demographics 
 
This is the last section. Please complete the following demographic questionnaire.  
 
 
  
Please enter your age: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Which option best describes your gender: 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Choose not to respond  (3)  
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Your ethnic identity: 
 Black  (1)  
 Asian/ Pacific Islander  (2)  
 Caucasian  (3)  
 Hispanic  (4)  
 Native American  (5)  
 Other:  (6) ________________________________________________ 
 Choose not to respond  (7)  
 
 
 
What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received?  
o Less than high school diploma  (1)  
o High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)  (2)  
o Some college but no degree  (3)  
o Associate degree in college (2-year)  (4)  
o Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)  (5)  
o Master's degree  (6)  
o Doctoral degree  (7)  
o Professional degree (JD, MD)  (8)  
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How often do you donate money to charity? 
o Never  (1)  
o Very rarely  (6)  
o On occasion (Holidays, charitable events)  (2)  
o Periodically (one or few times a year)  (4)  
o Regularly (monthly donor)  (3)  
 
 
 
End of Block: Demographics  
Start of Block: submit 
 
If there is anything that you would like your experimenter to know, please comment 
below. If not, please submit your answers. 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: submit  
 
 
 
136 
 
APPENDIX B 
MATERIALS FOR STUDY 2 
Study 2, part 1 
Start of Block: Screener 
 
This study involves the topic of blood donation. Which of the options below best describes your 
donor status: 
o Have never attempted to donate blood or plasma before  
o Have attempted before, have not completed blood or plasma donation (state reason) 
________________________________________________ 
o I have donated blood or plasma once  
o I have donated blood or plasma multiple times but not regularly  
o I donate blood or plasma on a regular basis  
o I am not eligible to donate blood or plasma  
 
End of Block: Screener  
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Start of Block: Intro 
 
Thank you for choosing to complete this study. On the next few pages, we will ask you to answer 
several questions on the topic of blood donation. There are no right or wrong answers in this 
section, we are only interested in your opinion and beliefs.  
 
End of Block: Intro  
Start of Block: Affect 
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Overall, when you think about the prospect of donating blood yourself, how do you feel? 
o Very Negative -10  
o -9  
o -8  
o -7  
o -6  
o -5  
o -4  
o -3  
o -2  
o -1  
o 0  
o 1  
o 2  
o 3  
o 4  
o 5  
o 6  
o 7  
o 8  
o 9  
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o Very Positive 10  
 
End of Block: Affect  
Start of Block: Single/Pseudo 
 
 
 
  
 Gabriella Martinez is dependent on blood transfusions every three weeks or so. She has a rare 
form of anemia – beta thalassemia major. She has been receiving transfusions since she was a 
baby and will continue to do so. Her family frequently attends blood drives to thank donors for 
the precious gift they are giving Gabriella and patients like her.  
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[PSEUDO CONDITION] 
 
  
 Gabriella Martinez is dependent on blood transfusions every three weeks or so. She has a 
rare form of anemia – beta thalassemia major. She has been receiving transfusions since 
she was a baby and will continue to do so. Her family frequently attends blood drives to 
thank donors for the precious gift they are giving Gabriella and patients like her.  
 
    
3 Facts about blood donation      
 4.5 million Americans will a need blood transfusion each year.   
 43,000 pints: amount of donated blood used each day in the U.S. and Canada. 
 Someone needs blood every two seconds.  
 
End of Block: Single/Pseudo  
Start of Block: Structured 
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We would like you to think more deeply about the factors that might influence your feelings 
toward donating blood. When considering the prospect of donating blood, please rate how much 
the following factors from the previous information should influence your feelings 
toward donating blood: 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Significantly Extremely 
Physical 
discomfort 
associated 
with the act 
of donating 
blood  
o  o  o  o  o  
The facts 
provided 
about blood 
donation need  o  o  o  o  o  
The physical 
benefit to the 
recipient of 
the donation  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
End of Block: Structured  
Start of Block: Deliberation 
 
Before continuing, we would like you to think more deeply about the factors that might influence 
your feelings toward donating blood. Please spend the next 30 seconds thinking about the factors 
that might influence your feelings toward donating blood. The survey will automatically advance 
to the next page in 30 seconds.  
 
 
End of Block: Deliberation  
Start of Block: Control 
 
Continue to the next page when you are ready. 
 
 
 
 
End of Block: Control  
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Start of Block: Warm glow 
 
We will also ask you to think about “warm glow”, a positive feeling that you may experience 
when you do something good for someone. Take a moment to think about one situation from your 
own life when you experienced this feeling. 
  
 Now, imagine that you went to blood drive and donated blood, providing a life-saving resource 
for person in need.   Please rate the strength of warm glow you would expect to feel if you 
donated blood by choosing a number between 0-100, using the options below: 
o 0-20 Low and no warm glow  
o 21-40  
o 41-60  
o 61-80  
o 81-100 High to extreme warm glow  
 
 
Page Break  
  
Now we would like you to specify that feeling a little bit further. You chose [RESPONSE 
HERE]. Now, please pick a number within the category. For example, if you selected 21-40 then 
you would specify a number between 21 and 40 that best fits your feeling of warm glow.  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
End of Block: Warm glow  
Start of Block: Post-manip 
 
Thank you. Now we would like you to consider the possibility of donating blood yourself in the 
next week while answering the following questions. Again, we will not be asking or requiring 
you to commit to a blood donation. There are no right or wrong answers in this section, we are 
only interested in your opinion and beliefs.  
 
End of Block: Post-manip  
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Start of Block: Attitudes 
 
Please rate how your feel about donating blood this week on the following dimensions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Unpleasant o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Pleasant 
Satisfying o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Unsatisfying 
Bad o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Good 
Harmful o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Beneficial 
Repulsive o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Attractive 
 
 
End of Block: Attitudes  
Start of Block: Subjective norm and normative beliefs 
 
 
Most people who are important to me think I should give blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
Please rate the likelihood that each entity below would think that you should donate blood next 
week: 
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Your parents 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Your friends 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Your extended family 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Your community members 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
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Your work or school peers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
End of Block: Subjective norm and normative beliefs  
Start of Block: Intentions 
 
I intend to give blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
I will try to give blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
improbably o  o  o  o  o  o  o  probable 
 
 
 
 
I have decided to give blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
 
 
End of Block: Intentions  
Start of Block: Self efficacy-beliefs 
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How confident are you that you will be able to give blood this week? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
not at all 
confident o  o  o  o  o  o  o  very confident 
 
 
 
 
If it were entirely up to me, I am confident that I would be able to give blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
agree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly disagree 
 
 
 
 
I believe I have the ability to give blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
definitely 
do o  o  o  o  o  o  o  definitely do not 
 
 
 
 
 I am capable of giving blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
extremely 
incapable o  o  o  o  o  o  o  extremely capable 
 
 
End of Block: Self efficacy-beliefs  
Start of Block: Self efficacy-ability 
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My giving blood this week is likely to be influenced by factors beyond my control 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
How much personal control do you feel you have over giving blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
control o  o  o  o  o  o  o  complete control 
 
 
 
 
It is mostly up to me whether or not I give blood this week 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
How much do you feel that giving blood this week is beyond your control? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
not at 
all o  o  o  o  o  o  o  very much so 
 
 
End of Block: Self efficacy-ability  
Start of Block: Control behaviors 
 
How likely it would be that each would facilitate and/or prevent you from giving blood next 
week: 
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A previous experience 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear of needles 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear of fainting 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear of being sick 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
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Fear of being catching some infection 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear of discovering some illness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
Losing time from study or work 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
A payment or incentive 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
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An efficient operation would encourage you to give blood 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
End of Block: Control behaviors  
Start of Block: Identity 
 
Please assess the items below in the extent that they are part of your identify 
 
 
 
 
To give blood is an important part of who I am 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
definitely 
not o  o  o  o  o  o  o  yes, definitely 
 
 
 
 
Giving blood is important to maintain a good self image of myself 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
definitely 
not o  o  o  o  o  o  o  yes, definitely 
 
 
 
 
I would describe myself as an advocate for blood donation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
definitely 
not o  o  o  o  o  o  o  yes, definitely 
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End of Block: Identity  
Start of Block: Image-rate 
 
Now we would like you to rate the images you viewed earlier.  
 
 
 
Now we would like you to rate the image you viewed earlier and one additional image.  
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How does this image make you feel? 
  
  Very Negative -10  
o -9  
o -8  
o -7  
o -6  
o -5  
o -4  
o -3  
o -2  
o -1  
o 0  
o 1  
o 2  
o 3  
 
 
 
153 
 
o 4  
o 5  
o 6  
o 7  
o 8  
o 9  
o Very Positive 10  
 
 
 
How does this image make you feel? 
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o Very Negative -10  
o -9  
o -8  
o -7  
o -6  
o -5  
o -4  
o -3  
o -2  
o -1  
o 0  
o 1  
o 2  
o 3  
o 4  
o 5  
o 6  
o 7  
o 8  
o 9  
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o Very Positive 10  
 
End of Block: Image-rate  
Start of Block: Demographics 
 
This is the last section. Please complete the following demographic questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
Please enter your age: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Which option best describes your gender? 
o Male  
o Female  
o Prefer not to answer  
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Please indicate your highest level of education 
o 8th grade or less  
o High school, no graduate  
o High school graduate  
o Vocational  
o Some college  
o College graduate  
o More than college graduate (specify: MA/MS, JD, MD, PhD or other) 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Which of the following best describes your ethnic background? 
o  White (Caucasian)  
o  Black (African-American)  
o  Native American  
o  Hispanic  
o  Asian or Pacific Islander  
o  Other ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Demographics  
Start of Block: Comment &End 
 
If there is anything that you would like your experimenter to know, please comment below. If 
not, please submit your answers. 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
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________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Comment &End  
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Study 2, part 2 
Start of Block: donation status 
 
Thank you for completing our first study. Which of the options below best describes your 
thoughts and behavior toward donating blood since the last survey: 
o I did not think about nor did I make an attempt to donate blood or plasma  
o I thought about donating blood or plasma but did not attempt any behaviors toward 
completing the donation  
o I completed steps toward donating blood or plasma (looking up blood center, got more 
information, talk to others, etc.) but did not attempt to complete a donation. (Describe 
behavior) ________________________________________________ 
o I donated blood or plasma since the last survey or am scheduled to do so in the near 
future  
o I attempted to donate since last survey, did not complete blood or plasma donation (state 
reason) ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: donor status  
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Start of Block: intro 
 
Thank you for choosing to complete this study. On the next few pages, we will again ask 
you to answer several questions on the topic of blood donation. There are no right or 
wrong answers in this section, we are only interested in your opinion and beliefs.  
 
End of Block: intro  
Start of Block: affect 
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Overall, when you think about the prospect of donating blood yourself, how do you feel? 
o Very Negative -10  
o -9  
o -8  
o -7  
o -6  
o -5  
o -4  
o -3  
o -2  
o -1  
o 0  
o 1  
o 2  
o 3  
o 4  
o 5  
o 6  
o 7  
o 8  
o 9  
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o Very Positive 10  
Please rate how your feel about donating blood in the future on the following dimensions 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Unpleasant o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Pleasant 
Satisfying o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Unsatisfying 
Bad o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Good 
Sad o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Happy 
Repulsive o  o  o  o  o  o  o  Attractive 
 
 
End of Block: affect  
Start of Block: Intentions 
 
Thinking into the future, what is your intention to donate blood? 
 
 
 
I intend to give blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
I will try to give blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
improbably o  o  o  o  o  o  o  probable 
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I have decided to give blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
 
 
End of Block: Intentions  
Start of Block: Social norms 
 
 
Most people who are important to me think I should give blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
Please rate the likelihood that each entity below would think that you should donate 
blood in the future: 
 
 
Your parents 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Your friends 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
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Your extended family 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Your community members 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
Your work or school peers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
End of Block: Social norms  
Start of Block: Self efficacy beliefs 
 
 
How confident are you that you will be able to give blood in the future? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
not at all 
confident o  o  o  o  o  o  o  very confident 
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If it were entirely up to me, I am confident that I would be able to give blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
agree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly disagree 
 
 
 
 
I believe I have the ability to give blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
definitely 
do o  o  o  o  o  o  o  definitely do not 
 
 
 
 
 
To what extent do you see yourself as capable of giving blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
extremely 
incapable o  o  o  o  o  o  o  extremely capable 
 
 
End of Block: Self efficacy beliefs  
Start of Block: Control beliefs 
 
 
My giving blood in the future is likely to be influenced by factors beyond my control 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
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How much control do you feel you have over giving blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
control o  o  o  o  o  o  o  complete control 
 
 
 
 
It is mostly up to me whether or not I give blood in the future 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
strongly 
disagree o  o  o  o  o  o  o  strongly agree 
 
 
 
 
How much do you feel that giving blood in the future is beyond your control? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
not at 
all o  o  o  o  o  o  o  very much so 
 
 
End of Block: Control beliefs  
Start of Block: Control behaviors 
 
How likely it would be that each would facilitate and/or prevent you from giving blood in 
the future: 
 
 
A previous experience 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
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Fear of needles 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear of fainting 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear of being sick 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear of being catching some infection 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
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Fear of discovering some illness 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
Losing time from study or work 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
A payment or incentive 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
 
 
An efficient operation would encourage you to give blood 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
unlikely o  o  o  o  o  o  o  likely 
 
 
End of Block: Control behaviors  
Start of Block: Identity 
 
Please assess the items below in the extent that they are part of your identify 
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To give blood is an important part of who I am 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
definitely 
not o  o  o  o  o  o  o  yes, definitely 
 
 
 
 
 
Giving blood is important to maintain a good self image of myself 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
definitely 
not o  o  o  o  o  o  o  yes, definitely 
 
 
 
 
I would describe myself as an advocate for blood donation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
no 
definitely 
not o  o  o  o  o  o  o  yes, definitely 
 
 
End of Block: Identity  
  
 
 
 
169 
 
Start of Block: Ending 
 
If you did not complete a blood donation since the last survey, please briefly describe the 
reason. 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Page Break  
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If there is anything that you would like your experimenter to know, please comment 
below. If not, please submit your answers. 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Ending  
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